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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon this Court by
Utah Constitution, Art. 8, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i)
(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument that

guilt should be inferred because Mr. Dunn invoked his right to
counsel during his arrest, and that the jury should consider the
impact of its verdict upon society in deciding Mr. Dunn's guilt or
innocence, improperly prejudice the jury.
2.
Dunn's

Did the trial court improperly admit evidence of Mr.
prior

conviction

of

assault

with

a

deadly

weapon

in

connection with an abduction after Mr. Dunn had taken the witness
stand in his own defense in reliance on a pretrial ruling excluding
such evidence.
3.

Was the circumstantial evidence adduced by the State on

its case-in-chief so inconclusive and unreliable that reasonable
minds could not have convicted Mr. Dunn beyond a reasonable doubt.
4.

Did the admission of evidence found in a warrantless

search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag violate the federal and state
constitutional

provisions

against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures.
5.

Did the admission of a gruesome color photograph of the

bloody corpse of the victim

stuffed

into the bathroom

1
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of the

motorhome constitute reversible error when the photograph had no
unusual probative value, any facts established by the photograph
were or could have been established by other means and were not
contested by Mr. Dunn, and the State's evidence against Mr. Dunn
was weak.
6.

Did defense counsel's failure to request proper jury

instructions on uncorroborated accomplice testimony and the defense
of compulsion, when the State contended that Mr. Dunn was guilty
only

as

an

accomplice,

constitute

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the Sixth
Judicial

District

Court

in

and

for

Sevier

County,

Utah,

the

Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding, by which the defendant-appellant
was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated kidnapping.
A copy of the Judgment of Conviction is attached as Addendum A.1
Mr. Dunn seeks reversal of the convictions, or, at a minimum,
a new trial.

x

Mr. Dunn's 1981 conviction was originally affirmed by this
Court in 1982. State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709 (Utah 1982). In 1990,
this Court reinstated Mr. Dunn's direct appeal after concluding,
on writ of habeas corpus, that Mr. Dunn's first appeal was
constitutionally defective due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, noting that "there might be some merit to some of Dunn's
issues." Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1990). Mr. Dunn
has been incarcerated since 1981.
2
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Statement of the Facts
On January 5, 1981, after a four-day jury trial in the Sixth
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Don V, Tibbs presiding,
appellant Robert W. Dunn was convicted of second degree murder
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978), a first degree felony, and
aggravated kidnapping under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1978), then
a capital felony,2 for which he received concurrent sentences of
five years to life and life imprisonment.
had

been

represented

at

trial

by

Marcus

Mr. Dunn, an indigent,
Taylor,

an

attorney

appointed by the court.
The Case-In-Chief
The evidence adduced against Mr. Dunn on the State's case-inchief was entirely circumstantial.

That evidence showed that on

August 14, 1980, the Utah Highway Patrol received a telephone call
from a hitchhiker who reported that he had seen a man pounding on
the rear window from inside the back of a motorhome as it pulled
away from a service station in Richfield, Utah.

T. 250-52, 260.3

Shortly afterward, UHP Trooper Bud Larsen stopped a vehicle fitting
the description given by the hitchhiker.

Mr. Dunn was driving.

Aggravated kidnapping was reduced to a first degree felony by
a 1983 amendment.
3

As cited herein, "T.
" refers to a copy of the original
trial transcript, which is on file with the Court as part of a
reconstructed record pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the original indexed and paginated trial
record having been destroyed by the Attorney General's office
during Mr. Dunn's habeas proceedings in this Court.
3
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T. 260-62.

As Trooper Larsen approached the driver's side of the

vehicle, a second man, later identified as Howard Scott, appeared
from

inside

the

passenger seat.

back

of

T. 442.

the motorhome

and

sat

in

the

front

The body of Ernest Sprinkle, dead from

•

two gunshot wounds to his chest and abdomen, was found on the floor
of the bathroom in the back of the motorhome.
The

next

warrant.

A

day,

the

motorhome

was

T. 263.

searched

.25 calibre automatic pistol was

pursuant

to

a

*tl

found under the

mattress in a sleeping compartment above the cab of the motorhome,
on the passenger's side.

T. 273-74.

Two spent shells, fired from

0

the pistol, were found inside a stove in the back of the motorhome.
T. 291-94.
The

State

admitted

that

Scott

was

the

triggerman,

contended that Mr. Dunn was guilty as an accomplice.

but

I

T. 230, 246.

Other than Mr. Dunn's mere presence in the motorhome, only two
pieces of evidence

adduced

by the State on

its case-in-chief

$

connected Mr. Dunn to the crime. Deputy Gerald Nice testified that
Scott, during an interrogation in which he confessed to having tied
up and shot Sprinkle himself, claimed that the gun belonged to Mr.
Dunn.

T. 317.

i

And, a supply of unspent .25 calibre rounds was

found inside a duffle bag identified as belonging to Mr. Dunn.
T. 277-78, 287-88.

Other evidence, however, suggested that the gun

f|

belonged to Scott, T. 374-75, and that Scott had stashed the bag

1
4
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4

of bullets in Mr. Dunn's duffle bag.

T. 294-97, 319, 344, 345-

46.
The Search
At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the contents of
the duffle bag.

T. 285-86.

Evidence received on the suppression

motion showed that at the jail on the night of his arrest, Mr. Dunn
advised Deputy Sheriff Clyde Page that he had a medical condition
and asked him to retrieve his prescription medicine from his duffle
bag which had been left in the motorhome.

T. 279-80.

Mr. Dunn

described the bag as a yellow duffle bag with some shoes tied on
it.

T. 283.

Deputy Page informed Mr. Dunn that a search of the

motorhome would be conducted the next day and that he would get Mr.
Dunn's medicine then.

T. 280.

The next day, a warrant was obtained

for a search of the

motorhome and its contents and an extensive, six-hour search was
conducted.

A yellow duffle bag was found in the rear of the

motorhome, but was not opened or searched at that time.
81.

T. 280-

Instead, because it was getting late and he believed he had

the right to search anything found in the motorhome, Deputy Page
brought the bag to the jail.

T. 280, 284.

There, he searched the

duffle bag in the presence of Sheriff Rex Huntsman and Sevier
County Attorney R. Don Brown.

T. 280-84.

found at the top of the duffle bag.

A bag of ammunition was

T. 283.

Near the bottom of

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the duffle bag, Deputy Page found several vials of prescription
medicine.

T. 283.

Further evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing and at
trial established that Mr. Dunn had instructed the police that his
medicine was at the bottom of the duffle bag, P. 1214, and that the
first item found by Deputy Page at the top of the duffle bag was
a blue bag which he described as a "bank bag."

T. 296.

The blue

bag contained some toilet articles and a small red bag closed with
a drawstring.

Only upon opening the red bag, did Deputy Page find

the unspent bullets.

T. 296; P. 121-23.

The Photograph
Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude from evidence
a color photograph taken by police of the bloody corpse of the
victim stuffed into the bathroom of the motorhome.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

T. 227-28;

Defense counsel argued the photograph was

inflammatory and unnecessary because the fact and manner of the
homicide was uncontested.

T. 227.

Indeed, the State did not

contend that Mr. Dunn either physically struck the victim, T. 230,
or fired the pistol killing the victim.

T. 305. An autopsy report

and photograph of the body were admitted into evidence pursuant to
stipulation.

T. 320-21.

The trial court denied the motion and the

photograph was received in evidence at trial.

T. 229-300.

4

As cited herein, "P.
" refers to a copy of the original
preliminary hearing transcript which is on file with the Court as
part of the reconstructed record.
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The Defense
Mr. Dunn testified in his own defense as follows:

In early

August 1980, he was hitchhiking to Texas from his home in San
Francisco to visit his mother and to seek employment.

T. 398-99.

In Barstow, California, Sprinkle stopped his motorhome and offered
Mr. Dunn a ride to Las Vegas.

T. 401-02.

Sprinkle also agreed to

give Scott, and a third hitchhiker named Pete, a ride.

T. 402-03.

Scott was quiet during the ride, rarely saying anything except
to himself.

T. 403. Sprinkle stopped once at a gas station to buy

a six-pack of beer, and again at a small town just south of Las
Vegas,

where he went

into a casino and

gambled

for an hour.

T. 404.
The motorhome arrived in Las Vegas just before dark on August
13, 1980. T. 405. There, the hitchhikers removed their belongings
from the motorhome and the four men went their separate ways.
T. 405-08.

Occasionally, however, Mr. Dunn, Scott and Sprinkle ran

into each other in various casinos.
playing "21" and drinking heavily.
he would

give Mr. Dunn

and Scott

gambling and buying drinks.

T. 407-08.

T. 409.
small

Sprinkle was

Throughout the night
amounts of money

T. 404, 407, 409-11, 470.

for

Around

11:00 p.m., Sprinkle offered Mr. Dunn and Scott a ride to Colorado.
T. 411.
About five miles outside of Las Vegas, Sprinkle pulled over
and asked Scott to drive, but he declined because he did not have

7
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a driver's license.

Sprinkle then asked Mr. Dunn to drive and he

agreed because Sprinkle had been weaving on the road.

T. 413-14.

When they reached Mesquite, Nevada, they again stopped at a casino.
T.

415.

Sprinkle

went

straight

continued to drink and play "21".
casino

cafe.

Scott

joined

to

the

gambling

tables

and

Mr. Dunn had breakfast in the

Sprinkle

in

gambling,

and

would

sometimes steal poker chips from Sprinkle, cashing them in and
pocketing the money.

T. 419-20.

They left Mesquite at daybreak, with Mr. Dunn driving because
Sprinkle was too inebriated to drive.

At one point, Sprinkle went

into the back and laid down on the floor and Scott sat in the
passenger's seat.

Mr. Dunn tried to strike up a conversation with

Scott, but Scott kept mostly to himself.

After they had travelled

a while, Scott went into the back and, without saying a word, hit
Sprinkle over the head.

Sprinkle jumped up and said, "Don't hurt

me and I'll give you anything you want."

Pointing a gun, which

Mr. Dunn had never seen before, at Sprinkle's head, Scott ordered
Sprinkle to shut up or he would blow his head off.
ordered Mr. Dunn to keep quiet.
drive.

Scott also

Frightened, Mr. Dunn continued to

Scott tied Sprinkle's wrists together and put him in the

bathroom.

T. 422-27.

When they reached Richfield, Utah, Scott ordered Mr. Dunn to
pull into an Amoco station to buy a fuse for the CB radio.

T. 431.

Scott was holding the gun in his hand as they pulled into the

8
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station, and, while there, Scott would not let Mr. Dunn out of his
reach.

T. 432-34.

At Scott's orders, Mr. Dunn bought the fuse and

tried to install it.

He was shaking with fear and trying to

install the fuse when he heard a noise in the back.
turned

his head

T. 435-36.

and

T. 435.

He

saw Sprinkle coming out of the bathroom.

Scott ran for Sprinkle, again forcing him into the

bathroom and yelled, "Get this damn thing out of here."

T. 436.

Scared, Mr. Dunn pulled out of the station, almost colliding with
a truck.

Mr. Dunn heard noises and shouting in the back of the

motorhome, but could not see all that was going on.

T. 437-38.

A couple of miles down the road, he heard the gun go off.

T. 438.

Several times during the above episode, Scott had threatened Mr.
Dunn with the gun.

Thinking for sure he was next, Mr. Dunn drove

slowly through the town deliberately missing the 1-70 turnoff and
hoping to catch someone?s attention.

T. 438-441.

later, the motorhome was stopped by the police.

A short while
Mr. Dunn felt

relieved when the officer ordered him to step out of the vehicle.
T. 443.
The Prior Conviction
Defense counsel moved before trial to exclude Mr. Dunn's 1973
felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
trial court ruled

the prior conviction

impeach

character

or

T. 236-37.

rebut

evidence

T. 234.

The

inadmissible except to

offered

by

the

defense.

In reliance on that ruling, Mr. Dunn testified without

9
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putting his character in issue.

T. 388-445.

After Mr. Dunn had

testified on direct, the State moved to admit the prior conviction
and the court reversed its pretrial ruling.

T. 444, 447.

On

cross-examination, Mr. Dunn was required to testify not only that
he had been convicted of the felony charge, but also that the crime
involved the abduction of a girl.

T. 447.

Testimony of Howard Scott
The only direct evidence against Mr. Dunn adduced by the State
was the testimony of Howard Scott, the admitted triggerman.
was called by the State only on rebuttal.

Scott

T. 491. After obtaining

a hung jury at his own trial for the Sprinkle murder two weeks
earlier, T. 498,

Scott had given a recorded statement about the

crime and pleaded guilty to second degree murder in exchange for
his testimony against Mr. Dunn.

T. 519.

Scott testified that Mr.

Dunn wanted to rob Sprinkle, and that they both tied Sprinkle up
and put him in the motorhome.

T. 493.

He claimed he hit Sprinkle

on the head and shot him, using a gun belonging to Mr. Dunn, only
because Mr. Dunn had told him to.

T. 492-94.

On cross examination, Scott denied having entered the plea
bargain

and

statement.
that

claimed

to

T. 498, 509.

Scott was

have

no

recollection

of

the

recorded

The State elicited testimony on redirect

a diagnosed

pathological

liar.

T.

510.

The

prosecutor then impeached his own witness by taking the stand on
surrebuttal to establish the existence and terms of Scott's guilty
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plea and the contents of the recorded statement.
the

recorded

statement

Scott f s

and

T. 518-19.

Both

testimony

were

trial

inconsistent with several prior statements Scott had made about the
crime which exculpated Mr. Dunn.
510.

T. 309-315, 395-96, 481-83, 497-

In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Scott

"would tell a lie any time to make him look good."

T. 556.

Closing Argument
In his closing argument, the prosecutor made reference to Mr.
Dunn's request for counsel at the arrest scene.

T. 575.

The

prosecutor used this remark to infer guilt on the part of Mr. Dunn,
and to disparage his defense of coercion and duress.

1x3.

The

State also argued to the jury that they should consider societal
concern and outrage regarding the crime in deciding Mr. Dunn's
guilt or innocence, T. 549, and referred to pretrial publicity
surrounding the case and the fact that the victim did not have
twelve jurors to decide whether he should live or die.

T. 548.

Jury Instructions
Defense counsel did not request, nor did the court give, any
jury instruction regarding uncorroborated
T. 531-48.

accomplice testimony.

The court gave an instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of

compulsion, but the instruction was improper because it did not
state the prosecution has the burden to prove the absence of
evidence supporting the affirmative defense.

T. 544.

Jury Instruction No. 30 is included as Addendum B.
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A copy of

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
During closing argument at Mr. Dunn's trial, the prosecutor
made remarks suggesting that the jury should infer Mr. Dunn's guilt
from his invocation of his right to counsel at his arrest and

4

consider the impact of its verdict upon society in determining Mr.
Dunn's guilt or innocence.

Similar remarks by the same prosecutor

have been held improper by this Court in other cases.

£

Before Mr. Dunn took the witness stand in his own defense, the
trial court ruled that his prior conviction of assault with a
deadly weapon was inadmissible unless Mr. Dunn adduced evidence of
his own "good character."

Mr. Dunn took the stand in reliance upon

the trial court's ruling and did not give character testimony.

On

cross-examination, the trial court reversed its prior ruling and
allowed

the

prosector

4

to

question

conviction and its circumstances.

Mr.

Dunn

concerning

£

the

The trial court's reversal of

its own prior ruling was unfairly prejudicial.

The prejudicial

<l

effect of the trial court's ruling after Mr. Dunn had testified was
heightened

by

the

fact that the prior conviction

involved

an

abduction and was similar to the aggravated kidnapping charge in

4

this case.
Mr. Dunn was charged in the abduction and killing of Sprinkle
only as an accomplice.

The evidence presented by the State on its

case-in-chief was entirely circumstantial,

failed

4

to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dunn had the requisite specific

I
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intent to assist Scott in committing the crimes, and failed to
eliminate

all

reasonable

alternative

hypotheses

of

innocence.

Reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Mr.
Dunn's guilt and his conviction should therefore be reversed.
A key piece of the evidence adduced by the State against Mr.
Dunn was a bag of unspent bullets found in a duffle bag identified
as belonging to Mr. Dunn.

That evidence was discovered in an

unlawful search of the duffle bag and should have been suppressed.
The search of the duffle bag violated the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution because it was neither within the scope
of a warrant issued for the search of the motorhome, nor within any
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.

The search also

violated article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution because
there were no exigent circumstances for a warrantless search of the
bag.
The trial court erroneously received in evidence a gruesome
color photograph of the corpse of the victim.
presumptively

unfairly

prejudicial

because

The photograph was
it

had

no

unusual

probative, or essential evidentiary, value. Thus, admission of the
photograph was contrary to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Although the only direct evidence adduced against Mr. Dunn was
the uncorroborated testimony of Scott, Mr. Dunn's defense counsel
failed

to

accomplice

request

a

cautionary

testimony.

Although

instruction

on

Mr.

only

Dunn's
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uncorroborated
defense

was

compulsion,

defense

counsel

failed

to

request

an

instruction

explaining that the prosecution must disprove that defense beyond
a

reasonable

doubt.

Reasonably

competent

counsel

would

have

requested these instructions which were critical to the defense
and, but for these errors, it is reasonably probable that the jury
would have acquitted Mr. Dunn.
The conviction should be reversed based upon the insufficiency
of the evidence.

At a minimum, a new trial is required.

Given the

weakness of the State's case against Mr. Dunn, which was primarily
based upon circumstantial evidence, none of the above errors can
be viewed as harmless.

In addition, the cumulative effect of those

errors leaves no doubt that Mr. Dunn was deprived of a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT IMPROPERLY PREJUDICED
THE JURY AND LEAD TO CONSIDERATION OF IMPERMISSIBLE
FACTORS
During closing argument, the prosecutor made several improper,

prejudicial remarks.

Some of these remarks attempted to infer Mr.

Dunn's guilt because he invoked his right to counsel:
[Officer Larson] came up to the vehicle and
Mr. Dunn told him that this was a drive-out
vehicle from California. How did he appear?
Calm, very calm. Then what happened? Officer
Larson found the body and walked up to him and
said "What can you tell me about the body back
there?" What does Mr. Dunn say? "I want a
lawyer.
I want a lawyer."
Is that a
frightened man?
Is that a man that's so
frightened . . . that he doesn't know what to
do or how to get away? "I want a lawyer."
(T 575).
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Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge erroneously ruled
that this was proper argument,

T. 576•

An attempt by the State to infer guilt from a defendant's
exercise of his constitutionally protected right to counsel is a
denial

of

that

constitutional

prosecutorial conduct.

right

and

is

impermissible

Zemina v. Solem, 438 F.Supp. 455, 465-66

(D.S.D. 1977), aff 'd. Zemina v. Solem, 573 F.2d

1027 (8th Cir.

1978); State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1980).
The prosecutor's

improper argument was not harmless.

trial, Mr. Dunn's only defense was compulsion.

At

The prosecutor's

argument went to Mr. Dunn's state of mind and was intended to
undermine

this

defense.

The

prosecutor's

improper

argument

impermissibly compromised constitutionally guaranteed rights.

See

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986).
The prosecutor's impermissible argument was likely to have
influenced the jury.
Where,

as

here,

See State v. Smith, 700 P. 2d 1106 (1985).

proof

of

an

accused's

guilt

is

based

upon

circumstantial evidence, there is a greater likelihood that the
jury was improperly influenced by the prosecutor's remarks.
v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984).

State

The prejudicial effect

of the prosecutor's improper remarks was particularly strong in
this case as they were made during
defense

counsel

from

challenging

the

rebuttal, thus
prosecutor's

preventing
suggestion.

Given the context in which the prosecutorial remarks were made, and
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the constitutional rights involved, the use of Mr. Dunn's request
for an attorney to infer guilt requires reversal and a new trial.
The prosecutor made another improper argument which called to
the

attention

considered.

of

the

jurors

matters

they

should

not

have

The prosecutor stated:

even more important than Ernest Sprinkle,
Robert Dunn and Howard Scott or anyone else,
is the impact that every jury decision has on
the criminal system and that? s the most
important factor you need to consider in
reaching a just and honest decision here today
because you're going to have to live with it
and so is society and you are all aware of the
publicity that surrounds this case, that
surrounds any first degree murder case and the
impact that it has when the jury reaches a
verdict one way or another. Make sure before
you determine that there is reasonable doubt,
make sure that before you elevate some of the
concerns to the point of a reasonable doubt,
that you are being fair to the most important
segment of society at large.
T. 549.

In two cases involving

the same county attorney who

prosecuted this case, this Court has held that similar suggestions
that the jury has a duty to convict on some basis other than the
evidence are improper argument.

See State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d

400, 402 (Utah 1986); State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah
1985).

Here,

the

prosecutor

suggested

that,

apart

from

the

evidence before it, the jury had an obligation to convict Mr. Dunn
based on societal concerns.

The prosecutor also attempted to stir

the juror's emotions by suggesting that the victim was not afforded
twelve jurors to determine whether he should live or die.
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T.548.

These

statements

were

totally

outside

the

evidence

and

were

flagrant attempts to inflame the passions of the jury.
In State v. Smith, in remarks strikingly similar to those he
made in this case, prosecutor R. Don Brown told the jury:
It ! s not Curtis Ray Smith that's on trial
alone. It's our way of life, you and I, and
how the public is going to perceive how the
criminal law does its job. Do we go so far in
determining that we don't punish an innocent
man that we let too many guilty ones go or do
we look at the cold hard facts and, even
though the hammer of justice is about to fall,
do our jobs, because ladies and gentlemen, if
we don't, we know what the result is going to
be.
Id.

In finding that the prosecutor erred in including the remarks

in his summation, the Court explained that the remarks "suggested
that the jury had some obligation beyond the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the defendant solely on the basis of evidence
introduced

at

trial."

Id.

The

remarks

made

to

the

jury

considering the charges against Mr. Dunn were just as flagrant, if
not

more

so,

than

those

made

in

Smith

and

Andreason.

The

prosecutor here told the jury that the "most important factor" in
their deliberations should be the impact of the verdict on society.
This was clearly erroneous.
Under

the

circumstances

of

this

case,

the

jurors

were

"probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their
verdict."

Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402.

In Andreason, the record

did not contain substantial or independent evidence of defendant's
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guilt; rather, the State's case relied on circumstantial evidence,
as was true here.

This Court held that given those circumstances,

the jurors were more likely than not influenced by an improper
argument and therefore reversed defendant's conviction and remanded
for a new trial.

Id.,

at 403.

In similar situations, remarks such as those made by the
prosecutor in this case have warranted reversal and a new trial.
The same remedy is mandated here.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED
DUNN'S PRIOR CONVICTION

EVIDENCE

OF MR.

Just before trial, counsel moved to exclude evidence of Mr.
Dunn's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon ensuing
out of the abduction of a girl.

T. 234.

The prosecutor argued

that if Mr. Dunn testified at trial, the prior conviction was
admissible as impeachment evidence.

T. 235-36.

The trial court

reserved ruling on the admissibility of the prior conviction, but
clearly stated that it would not admit the evidence unless Mr. Dunn
put on affirmative evidence of his good character.

T. 236.

The

trial court also definitively ruled that the prosecutor could not
offer the prior conviction as evidence in the State's case-inchief.

T. 232.

The court further required the prosecutor to make

a motion to the court out of the jury's presence before offering
evidence of the prior conviction.

T. 237-38.

In reliance on the trial court's ruling, Mr. Dunn elected to
testify in his own behalf.

His testimony carefully avoided any
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affirmative evidence of good character.

T. 388-445.

After direct

examination, the prosecution moved to admit evidence of Mr. Dunn's
prior conviction for impeachment purposes.

At this point, the

trial court reversed its prior ruling and granted the motion with
no explanation or discussion about why the evidence should now be
admitted, even though Mr. Dunn's direct testimony had not offered
evidence of good character.

The prosecution then began its cross

examination of Mr. Dunn with evidence of the prior conviction.
Defense counsel objected, but was overruled.

T. 446-48.

Counsel made a pre-trial motion to learn whether the trial
court would admit the prior conviction if Mr. Dunn testified.

The

court held that it would not if Mr. Dunn presented no evidence of
good character.

Accordingly, Mr. Dunn decided

to testify but

deliberately presented no evidence of good character to avoid the
admission

of

his

prior

conviction.

detriment upon the court's ruling.
prejudicial

Mr.

Dunn

relied

to

his

It was obviously improper and

for the court to change its ruling after Mr. Dunn

testified.
A

defendant

has

the

right

to a pre-trial

admissibility of prior convictions.

ruling

on

the

State v. Clavo, 520 So.2d 415

(La. 1987) (case 1 ) ; People v. Lytal, 415 Mich. 603, 329 N.W.2d
738,

740

(1982).

At minimum,

the trial

court

should

admissibility before the defendant takes the stand.

decide

State v.

Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 435 n.3 (N.D. 1979); People v. Sandoval,
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34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 854 (1974).
policy

underlying

these decisions

is that of

fairness

The

to the

defendant who must plan his trial strategy based upon the court ! s
ruling. A defendant is significantly disadvantaged if he is forced
to make an uninformed decision of whether to testify.
The

improper

admission

of

convictions is reversible error.
1335 (Utah 1986).

a

criminal

defendant's

prior

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,

The prejudice resulting from that error was

compounded in this case because the prior conviction was for an
offense similar to the one charged.

This Court has recognized that

the similarity of a prior conviction to the one charged "would be
extremely prejudicial and tend to inflame the jury . . . ."
The

improper

admission

of

Mr. Dunn's

prior

conviction

Id.

caused

substantial prejudice to Mr. Dunn and warrants reversal of his
conviction and a new trial.
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO
CONVICT MR. DUNN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel made a
motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that

insufficient

evidence had been adduced against Mr. Dunn to convict him beyond
a reasonable doubt.

T. 323.

The motion should have been granted.

The State bears the burden of proving each element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction should be reversed
where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict, is so insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable minds
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must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's
guilt.

State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148-49 (Utah 1983); State v.

McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982).

The evidence presented

by the State against Mr. Dunn failed to establish the requisite
elements of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State admitted that Scott was the triggerman and contended
only that Mr. Dunn was guilty as an accomplice.

Utah Code Ann. §

76-2-202 defines an accomplice as a "person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of an offense . . . who solicits,
requests,

commands,

encourages,

or

intentionally

aids

another

person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense . . . ."
Thus, to convict Mr. Dunn of second degree murder and aggravated
kidnapping, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Dunn "intentionally and knowingly" assisted in the
commission of those crimes.
302

(1978).

The

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 and 76-5-

State was

also

required

to

prove

beyond

a

reasonable doubt the absence of compulsion, the affirmative defense
raised by Mr. Dunn.

State v. Starks, 627 P. 2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981).

The evidence adduced by the State on its case-in-chief against
Mr. Dunn was entirely circumstantial.
solely

on

circumstantial

evidence

may

While a conviction based
be

sustained,

State

v.

Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 724-25 (Utah 1982), the evidence supporting
such a conviction must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.

State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); State v.
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Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).

The evidence presented on

the State's case-in-chief against Mr. Dunn failed to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
The primary evidence of any complicity by Mr. Dunn in the
crime was his mere presence in the motorhome.

That evidence showed

only that Mr. Dunn was driving the motorhome at the time Mr.
Sprinkle was shot by Scott.

Mere presence during the commission

of a crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an accomplice.
A person's mere presence, even with the knowledge that a crime is
about to be committed, does not make the person an accomplice
unless the person has an intent to join in the crime and advises,
encourages, or assists in the perpetration of the crime.

State v.

Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d
794, 797 (Utah 1977); State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662,
665 (1972).
Other than Mr. Dunn's presence while driving the motorhome
during the shooting of Mr. Sprinkle, the only evidence adduced by
the State on its case-in-chief connecting Mr. Dunn to the crime was
Scott's statement to the police that the gun used to kill Sprinkle
belonged to Mr. Dunn and the unspent .25 calibre bullets found in
a

duffle

bag

identified

as

belonging

to

Mr.

Dunn.

That

circumstantial evidence, however, was insufficient to establish
that

Mr.

Dunn

"voluntarily

and

knowingly"

assisted

in

the

commission of either second degree murder or aggravated kidnapping.
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Possession of a gun and ammunition that was later used by another
to commit a crime certainly does not establish specific intent to
assist in the commission of that crime.

Possession of a weapon may

evidence only an intent to protect oneself.

Nor would the fact

that Scott obtained possession of a gun belonging to Mr. Dunn
establish such an intent by Mr. Dunn.

Clearly, Scott could have

obtained the gun other than by Mr. Dunn's voluntary act or without
Mr. Dunn? s knowledge or intention that the gun would be used to
commit a crime.
Moreover,

as

Scott's

later

rebuttal

testimony

clearly

demonstrated, any statement by Scott was so inherently unbelievable
that reasonable minds could not rely on it to find Mr. Dunn guilty
beyond

a

reasonable

doubt.

Scott

made

numerous

inconsistent

statements on numerous different occasions about the crime, some
of

which

purported

exculpated him.

to

implicate

Mr.

Dunn

and

others

T. 309-315, 395-96, 481-83, 497-510.

which

The State's

own recognition of the unreliability of any of these statements is
shown by its failure to call Scott as a witness on its case-inchief despite the weakness of its case against Mr. Dunn and the
existence of the recorded statement recently taken from Scott in
exchange for his guilty plea.

In arguing to the jury that Scott

"would tell a lie any time to make him look good," T. 556, the
State conceded

that no statement of Scott could reasonably be

relied upon as evidence of Mr. Dunn's guilt.
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Finally, as shown below, evidence of the bullets should have
been suppressed. Without that evidence, reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Dunn's guilt.
Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction

•

of Mr. Dunn beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of second
degree murder and aggravated kidnapping.

Those convictions must

therefore be reversed.
IV.

€

THE SEARCH OF MR. DUNN'S DUFFLE BAG VIOLATED THE U.S. AND
UTAH CONSTITUTIONS AND EVIDENCE FOUND AS A RESULT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED
The State's case-in-chief against Mr. Dunn rested entirely on

circumstantial evidence.
as

a

result

of

two

€

The evidence showed that the victim died

gunshot

wounds, and

defendant, Scott, fired the murder weapon.

that

Mr.

T. 494.

Dunn's coMr. Dunn was

I

linked to the crime only through his presence in the motorhome,
Scott's unreliable statement that the murder weapon belonged to Mr.
Dunn, and by a bag of bullets found in a duffle bag identified by
its contents as belonging to Mr. Dunn.

4

The bullets and contents

of the duffle bag should have been suppressed.
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures

i

are per se unreasonable unless they fall within narrowly defined
exceptions.

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758-60 (1979).

To

be valid, the search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag must have been
undertaken

either

circumstances

pursuant

falling

to

within

a
an

valid

search

exception

warrant

to

the

or

1

in

warrant
i
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requirement.

The search, however, was neither pursuant to warrant

nor within any exception to the warrant requirement.

Thus, the

evidence found in the search should have been suppressed.
A.
As

The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Warrantless
described

above,

shortly

after

his

arrest,

Mr.

Dunn

informed Officer Page that he needed prescription medicine, T. 280,
and described the duffle bag in which the medicine was located.
Officer Page located the duffle bag while searching the motorhome,
but did not search the bag or remove the medicine from the bag at
that time.

T. 280-81.

Instead, Officer Page brought the bag to

the police station, where it was searched at a later time.

T. 280-

84.
The search of Mr. Dunn's bag did not fall within the ambit of
the

search warrant, as the warrant obtained

motorhome.

covered

only

the

The execution of a search warrant is limited to the

specific places described in the warrant and does not extend to
additional or different places.

United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d

1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, denied sub nom., Hubbard v.
United States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
officers

to

search

the

motorhome

The search warrant allowed
and

its

contents,

but

once

property was removed from the premises specified in the warrant,
later searches of the removed property fell outside the warrant.
Taking the bag away from the premises specified within the warrant
removed the power and protection of the search warrant.
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B.

The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Not Incident To Mr.
Dunnf s Arrest

Because the search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag was not pursuant
to a valid warrant, to be upheld it must fall within one of the
narrowly

defined

exceptions

to

the

warrant

requirement.

A

warrantless search incident to an arrest may be permissible where
officers search the arrestee's person and the area "within his
immediate control."
(1977).

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15

These searches have been held necessary to safeguard the

arresting officer and to prevent evidence from being concealed or
destroyed.

This

exception

has

been

strictly

circumstances where necessary to achieve these aims.
to arrest" exception will not justify warrantless

limited

to

The "incident
searches of

luggage or other property where the search of that property is
remote in time or place from the arrest, Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15,
or where the property is in the control and custody of the police
and the threat of injury or destruction of evidence therefore no
longer exists.

See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)

(search of defendant's car after he had been arrested, searched and
taken to police headquarters held improper).
The search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag cannot be justified under
the "incident to arrest" exception.

The search was removed in time

and space from the arrest and, at the time of the search, Mr.
Dunn's bag was in the control and custody of the police.

At the

time of the search, Mr. Dunn no longer had access to his bag and
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4

the search was not necessary for the protection of officers or
evidence.
C.

The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Not A Valid Inventory
Search

Warrantless searches also may be allowed where subsequent to
an arrest officers have in their custody property of an arrestee
and

seek

to

inventory

its

contents

to

protect

an

arrestee's

property and to protect police from danger and accusations of theft
or loss.

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).

However, an

inventory search does not give officers unlimited authority to
search all personal effects of an arrestee, nor can they be used
as a subterfuge for police investigation.

1x3. at 372.

Permissible

inventory searches of closed containers are limited to those cases
where the police are acting under specific guidelines.
n.6.

_Id. at 374

"We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court found that

the Police Department's procedures mandated the opening of closed
containers and the listing of their contents.

Our decisions have

always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted
according to standardized criteria."

Id.

The Utah Court of Appeals described this requirement in State
v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 427-28 (Utah App. 1988).
"We read Bertine to establish that the Fourth
Amendment ijs violated if closed containers are
opened during a vehicle search in the absence
of
a
standardized,
specific
procedure
mandating their opening . . . .
[S]uch a
procedure insulates police from the claim
that, in a particular case, their opening
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closed containers was
'fishing expedition.1"
The testimony

nothing

more

than

of Deputy Page, the officer

%

a

conducting

the

search, demonstrates that the search was not part of a standardized
inventory, but rather a search for evidence.
certain

items

there

and

anything

that

motorhome, I had the right to go into."

"I was searching for

was

contained

T. 280.

in

the

Deputy Page's

1
search of the duffle bag was, in fact, a "fishing expedition."
Thus, the search of Mr. Dunn's bag was not a permissible inventory
search.
D.

Mr. Dunn Did Not Consent To The Search Of The Duffle Bag

Warrantless

searches

may

be

permissible

with

consent.

However, "[w]hen a prosecutor who seeks to rely upon consent to

I
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."
Bumper

v.

North

Carolina,

391

U.S.

543,

548

(1968).

"'The

4
existence of consent
government

is not lightly

to be inferred, ' and

the

'always bears the burden of proof to establish the

existence of effective consent.'"

United States v. Shaibu, 895

i
F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1990).

Moreover, courts must indulge

every reasonable presumption against the waiver of
constitutional

rights,

including

unreasonable searches and seizures.
458, 464 (1938).

the

right

to

fundamental
be

free

of

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.

The State's burden is greater where consent is
i
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claimed to have been given while the defendant is under arrest.
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. 1951).
Here,

Mr. Dunn was

in police custody

and

had

condition for which he needed prescription medicine.

a medical

The medicine

was in his duffle bag, which was also in police custody.

Under the

circumstances, Mr. Dunn had no choice but to request his jailers
to retrieve his medicine for him, and proof of that request alone
does not satisfy the State's burden of showing "free and voluntary"
consent to a search of the duffle bag.
there cannot be consent."

"Where there is coercion

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at

548.
Furthermore, the scope of a search must be limited to the
actual consent given.
(10th Cir. 1985).

United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377

"Consent to search a specific area limits the

reasonableness of the search to that area.

Any police activity

that transcends the actual scope of the consent given encroaches
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."

Id.

Here, the

State failed to establish that the scope of any consent given by
Mr. Dunn reached all of the contents of his duffle bag.

In fact,

Mr. Dunn had instructed the police that his medicine was in the
bottom of the duffle bag.

P. 121.

Instead of simply looking for

Mr. Dunn's medicine at the bottom of the bag, the officers went
through the bag item by item.

T. 280-84.

The officers did not

look for Mr. Dunn? s medicine at the time he asked for it, but
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instead set the bag aside to be searched later.

At most, any

consent by Mr. Dunn gave the police a limited right to be in his
bag; it did not authorize a wholesale search of the bag f s contents.
E.

The Bullets Were Not In Plain View

The "plain view" doctrine allows police seizure of private
property where three requirements are met:

first, the officer must

have a prior justification for the intrusion into the property
where the evidence was found; second, the officer must discover the
evidence inadvertently; and third, the nature of the evidence must
be either "immediately apparent" or there must be "probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity."

Texas v. Brown,

460 U.S. 730, 737-742 (1983); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 465-469 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1071).

The

government has the burden of proving that each of these three
requirements are met.
141 (1st Cir. 1989).

United States v. Rutkowski, 877 F.2d 139,
Here, the State failed to adduce evidence on

the suppression motion establishing that the requirements of the
plain view doctrine were met.
As demonstrated by the record, the discovery of the evidence
contained in the duffle bag clearly was not inadvertent.

Deputy

Page, the officer conducting the search, testified as follows:
A:

No. We went ahead with the search
warrant and then when I got ready to
leave I just picked up the duffle
bag which I had a right to go
through at that time but I didn't go
through it, because I did my other
photographing and everything and
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just brought the duffle bag back to
the Sheriff's Office.
Q:

Now, you say, you had the right to
go through the duffle bag. Now, of
course, that's what we're deciding.
What made you think you had that
right?

A:

Anything -- I was searching for
certain items in there and anything
that
was
contained
within
the
motorhome, I had the right to go
into.

T. 280.
This testimony clearly shows that the police were searching
the entire bag and therefore the discovery of the evidence in the
bag was not inadvertent.
Nor did the State establish that the nature of the evidence
discovered
apparent."

in

the

search

of

the

duffle

bag

was

"immediately

Certainly, the bullets were not immediately apparent

or, indeed, apparent at all to the police.

Again, Mr. Dunn had

instructed the police that his medicine was in the bottom of the
duffle bag.

P. 121.

items he found
T. 296.

Deputy Page testified that one of the first

in the duffle bag was a small blue bank bag.

Instead of setting the bank bag aside and going to the

bottom of the duffle bag to search for Mr. Dunn's medicine, he
opened the bank bag, in which there were toiletry articles and a
small red bag closed with a drawstring.

^d.

the small red bag did he find the bullets.

Only upon opening
.Id.

Supreme Court has made clear:
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As the U.S.

•

the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not
be used to extend general exploratory search
from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.

4

4

While the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge was
modified somewhat in Texas v. Brown, the Court continues to require
that

there

be

probable

criminal activity.

cause

to

associate

460 U.S. at 741-42.

the

property

€

with

Here, the officers did not

have probable cause to associate the property in plain view - - a

4

small blue bank bag containing toiletry items -- with criminal
activity, as required by Texas v. Brown.

Indeed, Deputy Page had

to open not only the blue bag to discover the bullets.

He had to

I

open a second smaller red bag which also gave no clue as to its
contents.
F.

The Search Of
Constitution

The

Duffle

Bag

Violated

The

Utah

4

The search of the duffle bag was improper under the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.

But it also violated

i
Mr.

Dunn's

rights

Constitution.

under

Article

1,

section

14

of

the

Utah

This Court has indicated that in some circumstances,

the rules governing permissible searches and seizures under the
Utah Constitution provide more protection than those under the
United States Constitution.

State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460, 469
i
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I

(Utah 1990 ). 5

In Larocco, this Court indicated that once a court

finds that a privacy interest exists, "warrantless searches will
be

permitted

only

where

they

satisfy

their

traditional

justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or the
public or to prevent the destruction of evidence,"

.Ld. at 469-70.

Mr. Dunn clearly had a privacy interest in his duffle bag.

The

search conducted by Deputy Page was not to protect the safety of
police since it was not conducted at the time of the arrests or
even when the motorhome was searched pursuant to the warrant.
Instead, the duffle bag was searched later, at the police station.
Neither did the search serve the purpose of preventing the
destruction of evidence.

The officers were not in the process of

conducting an inventory of the bag, and they could have protected
the contents of the bag simply by securing it.

The officers were

not acting with the intent of securing the contents of the bag,
rather,

they

were

searching

the

bag

in

the

hope

of

finding

evidence.
Thus, there were no "exigent circumstances" justifying the
warrantless search of the duffle bag, Larocco, 794 P. 2d at 470, and
the evidence should have been suppressed under the Utah as well as
the United States Constitution.

Id. at 473.

5

See also, K. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure
Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
(unpublished manuscript attached as Addendum C ) .
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G.

The Denial of the Motion to Suppress Was Reversible Error

Mr.

Dunn's

conviction

rested

evidence linking him to the crime.

primarily

on

circumstantial

By attributing ownership and

control of the bullets and, therefore, inferentially, the murder

€

weapon to Mr. Dunn, the State strengthened considerably the alleged
link between Mr. Dunn and the crime.

Without this evidence, it is

reasonably probable that the outcome of the case would have been

€

different.
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 30, reversal is required where "a review
of the record persuades the court that without the error there was
a

reasonable

defendant."

likelihood

of

a

more

favorable

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d

result

913, 919

for

(Utah

•

the

1987),

quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984).

Here

I

the bag of bullets was one of only two items of physical evidence
tying Mr. Dunn to the crime.

The link between Mr. Dunn and the

other item, the gun, was established only through the unreliable
testimony of Scott.

I

As a result, it is far more than reasonably

likely that the bullets played a significant role in the jury T s
decision to convict.

Thus, the trial court's refusal to suppress

I

the contents of the duffle bag constituted reversible error.
V.

THE ADMISSION OF A GRUESOME COLOR CLOSEUP OF THE CORPSE OF
THE VICTIM WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The trial court received in evidence over defense counsel ! s

objection a closeup photograph of Sprinkle's corpse on the floor
of the bathroom

of the motorhome.

T.

227-28,

299-300.

The
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I

photograph, which was in color, shows the corpse bent into an
unnatural position next to the toilet, which is smeared with blood.
The victim's shirt is pulled up, partially baring his back, which
appears to be scratched and also smeared with blood.
clothing

is

soaked

with

blood

from

the

two

The victim's

gunshot

wounds.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which was in effect at
the time of Mr. Dunn's trial, provides that a "judge may in his
discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will
. . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . ."
Rule 45 was superseded in 1983 by Utah R. Evid. 403, which is
"substantively identical" to its predecessor.
P. 2d 750, 752 n. 1 (Utah 1986).

State v. Cloud, 722

In interpreting Rule 403, this

Court has stated:
Although the rule's language seems to
require a simple balancing of probative value
and potential for unfair prejudice, our past
decisions have recognized that inherent in
certain categories of relevant evidence is an
unusually
strong
propensity
to
unfairly
prejudice,
inflame, or mislead
a jury.
Evidence in these categories is uniquely
subject
to
being
used
to
distort
the
deliberative process and improperly skew the
outcome. Consequently, when evidence falling
within such a category is offered, we have
required a showing of unusual probative value
before it is admissible under rule 403.
In
the absence of such a showing, the probative
value of such evidence is presumed to be
"substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice."
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State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988), aff T d, State
v, Lafferty, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).

One such

category

of

homicide

victim's

corpse."

evidence

is

Id..

"gruesome

photographs

of

"Gruesome

photographs

will

excluded because the required showing of unusual
cannot be made.
the

gruesome

a

often

be

probativeness

This is because there is no legitimate need for

photographs

of

a

homicide

prosecutor's usually seek to introduce."

victim's

corpse

that

Id., at 1256-57.

The photograph at issue here should have been excluded from
evidence under Rule 45.

The photograph not only had no "unusual

probative value," it was completely irrelevant to any issue in
dispute at trial.

The State conceded that Scott had shot Sprinkle

and that Mr. Dunn had done nothing to physically strike the victim.
T. 230, 305.

The State's own evidence showed that Mr. Dunn was

driving the motorhome at the time Sprinkle was shot and stuffed
into the bathroom of the motorhome.

T. 250-62.

The facts that

Scott had shot Sprinkle and shoved him into the bathroom were
undisputed by Mr. Dunn.
In addition, any relevant facts established by the photograph
were (or certainly could have been) established by other means,
i.e., through the testimony of the law enforcement officers and the
medical examiner.
An important consideration in assessing the
probative value of a photograph is whether the
facts
shown
by
the
photograph
can
be
established by other means. In Garcia, [T]his
court
stated
that
the
introduction
of
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potentially prejudicial photographs of a
corpse is generally inappropriate if "the only
relevant evidence they convey can be put
before the jury readily and accurately by
other means not accompanied by the potential
prejudice."
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257, quoting State v. Garcia, 663
P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983).

Thus, the photograph here clearly had no

unusual probative value.
In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah 1986), this
Court made clear that absent a showing of unusual probative, or
"essential evidentiary" value, photographs depicting crime scenes
and victims' injuries are presumptively unfairly prejudicial and
should not be admitted into evidence.

"Only after a determination

has

have

been made

that

weighing be made."

the photographs
Idl. at 753.

such value

need

the

Here, the photographs had no

unusual probative value and therefore should have been excluded
without the necessity of a balancing analysis.
of the

factors

relevant

to the balancing

exclusion of the photograph at issue here.

Nevertheless, many

analysis

also

favor

Those factors include

whether the photographs are in color or black
and white, when they were taken in relation to
the crime, whether they are closeups or
enlargements, their degree of gruesomeness,
the cumulative nature of the evidence, and
whether facts shown are disputed by the
defendant.
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988).
Given the weakness of the State's evidence against Mr. Dunn,
the trial court's erroneous admission of the photograph was not
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harmless.

The photograph

allowed

the State

to emphasize

the

loathsomeness of acts concededly committed by Scott, deflecting
the

jury's

attention

from

involvement and culpability.

the

central

issue

of

Mr.

Dunn's

The State adduced scant evidence of

Mr. Dunn's involvement, all of which was circumstantial except for
the testimony of Scott who, as stated by the prosecutor, "would
tell a lie anytime to make him look good."

T. 556.

Under these

circumstances, there can be no confidence that the jury was not
unduly influenced by the photograph.

Mr. Dunn's conviction should

therefore be reversed and a new trial should be granted.
VI.

MR. DUNN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
TRIAL
The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel6 encompasses

the right to effective assistance of counsel during a criminal
trial.

Ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated where a

defendant shows:
[First]
that
counsel's
performance
was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.

6

Art. 1, § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees an
accused's right to counsel. The Utah provision guarantees as much
protection as the Sixth Amendment, and possibly more. The Utah
Constitution provides an independent basis for the relief requested
here.
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State v. Archuleta,
Strickland

v.

747 P. 2d

Washington,

1019, 1023

466 U.S.

668

(Utah

1987),

quoting

(1984),

reh'g

denied,

Strickland v. Washington, 467 U.S. 1267.
Ineffective assistance of counsel substantially prejudiced Mr.
Dunn's

defense.7

Counsel

failed

critical to Mr. Dunn's defense.

to

request

two

instructions

Absent these errors, there is a

probability that the results of Mr. Dunn's trial and appeal would
have been different
outcome.

sufficient

to undermine confidence

in the

Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023.

Failure

to

request

a

jury

ineffective assistance of counsel.
688 (Utah App. 1989).

instruction

can

constitute

State v. Moritzsky, 771 P. 2d

In Moritzsky, the Court of Appeals found

ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel failed to
request the appropriate defense of habitation instruction.
court held

that the defendant was entitled

The

to the defense of

habitation instruction and that there was "no conceivable tactical
basis for this omission."

Id.

at 692.

In addition, the court

found that the defendant was prejudiced by the omission and that
there was "a reasonable probability that the jury T s verdict would
have been more favorable to defendant had the proper instruction
been given."

Ld. at 693.

7

This Court has already held that Mr. Dunn's counsel rendered
ineffective assistance on his first appeal. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P. 2d
873, 878 (Utah 1990).
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Both of the elements of ineffective assistance of counsel are
present here.

"[C]ounsel rendered a deficient performance in some

demonstrable manner and . . . ! a reasonable probability exists that
except

for

ineffective

different.™

counsel,

the

result

would

have

been

State v. Crestani, 771 P. 2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989)

quoting State v. Verdi, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989).
A.

Failure To Request An Instruction Regarding
Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony Constituted
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel.

The only
accomplice

evidence

was

triggerman.

the

to support Mr. Dunn's

testimony

of

liability

co-defendant,

as an

Scott,

the

Scott testified that Mr. Dunn participated with Scott

in assaulting, binding and shooting the victim.

Scott's testimony

that Mr. Dunn was his accomplice was not corroborated by any other
witness or direct evidence.
explains

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7

treatment

of

uncorroborated

(1982)

the

proper

accomplice

a.

A conviction may be had on
testimony of an accomplice.

b.

In the discretion of the court, an instruction to
the jury may be given to the effect that such
uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with
caution and such an instruction shall be given if
the trial judge finds the testimony of the
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or
improbable.8

testimony:
the

uncorroborated

8

Section 77-17-7 took effect on July 1, 1980 and applied to
Mr. Dunn's trial which began on December 30, 1980. 1980 Utah Laws,
ch. 15 § 2.
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Under the similar federal rule, the Tenth Circuit has held that
failure to give a cautionary instruction regarding uncorroborated
accomplice testimony constitutes plain error.
Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1053 (10th Cir. 1980).

United States v.

A general instruction

regarding the credibility of witnesses is insufficient to inform
the jury how to use uncorroborated accomplice testimony properly.
Id.

at

1054.

"[l]f

the

testimony

of

an

accomplice

is

uncorroborated, 'the court must instruct the jury that testimony
of accomplices must be carefully scrutinized, weighed with great
care, and received with caution.'"

Id.

at 1053, quoting United

States v. Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1971).
Scott f s testimony was uncorroborated, self-contradictory and
improbable.

Indeed,

even

the prosecutor

T. 556. Section 77-17-7 clearly applied.
failed

to

request,

and

the

trial

called

Scott

a liar.

However, defense counsel

court

did

not

give,

any

instruction which cautioned the jury to "carefully scrutinize," and
"weigh

with

great

care,"

uncorroborated testimony.

or

"receive

with

caution"

Scott's

The only instructions given regarding

the credibility of witnesses were in insufficiently general terms.
Hill, 627 F.2d at 1054.
critical

to

maintain

the

A specific cautionary instruction was
fundamental

fairness

of

the

trial.

Counsel's failure to request the instruction was not within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
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But for counsel f s error, there is a reasonable probability
that

the

jury

accomplice.

would

not

have

found

Mr.

Dunn

guilty

as

an

The only direct evidence supporting the prosecution's

argument for accomplice liability was the testimony of Scott.

The

lack of a cautionary instruction left the jury unaware of the
significance

of

Scott's

bias

and

interest,

which

would

substantially detracted from his credibility as a witness.

have

Failure

to request an instruction or to object to the court's failure to
give one, was reversible error, substantially prejudiced Mr. Dunn's
case and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.

Failure To Request An Appropriate Instruction
On The Defense Of Compulsion Constituted
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Defense

counsel's

failure

to

request

an

appropriate

instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of compulsion also constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Dunn testified that, at the
time the crimes were committed, he was acting under compulsion and
therefore was not criminally liable for his conduct.

T. 435-36.

Compulsion is an affirmative defense to crimes against the person.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1978).

The prosecution carries the

burden to prove the absence of evidence supporting an affirmative
defense.

State

v.

Pur ant,

674

P.2d

638,

642

(Utah

1983).

"Clearly, a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in
presenting an affirmative defense.

. . . The defendant's evidence

need only raise a reasonable doubt as to any element of the crime
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to justify an acquittal,"

State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah

1981).
In State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah 1986), this Court
held that an instruction on an affirmative defense which does not
explain the prosecution's burden of proof is improper because it
may well raise the inference that the burden
is on the defendant. The proper course would
be for the court to explicitly state that the
defendant has no particular burden of proof on
the issue of withdrawal and that the question
is whether, taking all the evidence on the
issue into account, the state has shown beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant has not
withdrawn from the commission of the offense
and that he is guilty of the offense charged.
In this case, the trial court's instruction on the defense of
compulsion was error.

Defense counsel and the prosecution each

submitted virtually identical instructions on compulsion.

The

court gave the instruction as requested by the State, Instruction
No. 30, which reads as follows:
Under the law, an accused person is not guilty
of an offense if he is engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was coerced to
do so by use or threatened imminent use of
unlawful physical force upon him, which force
or threatened force a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would not have
resisted.
The defense of compulsion provided by
this section shall be unavailable to the
person
who
intentionally,
knowingly
or
recklessly places himself in a situation in
which it is probable that he will be subjected
to duress.
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If you find under all of the facts of
this case that the defendant was coerced as
herein defined, you must find him not guilty.
T. 554; Addendum B.
Noticeably absent from Instruction No. 30 is any discussion
of the burden of proof.

This was the only affirmative defense

instructed upon at Mr. Dunn's trial.

The instruction given for

each substantive offense explained that the prosecution has the
burden of proving each element of that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The

absence

of

any

burden

of

proof

explanation

in

Instruction No. 30 impermissibly allowed the jury to infer that Mr.
Dunn

had

the

burden

of

proving

his

affirmative

defense.

Instruction No. 30 was reversible error.
Reasonably

competent

counsel

would

have

requested,

and

objected to the court's failure to give, a compulsion instruction
which clearly explained that the prosecution must disprove the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant carries
no burden of persuasion.

The crux of Mr. Dunn's defense was that

he did not willingly participate in the crimes.

He testified that

Scott ordered him to keep quiet and threatened him with a gun.
T. 464.
case.

A proper compulsion instruction was vital to Mr. Dunn's
It is reasonably probable that with a proper compulsion

instruction the jury would have found that the prosecution did not
carry its burden of proof and that Mr. Dunn's evidence raised a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Therefore, the
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failure to

request an appropriate instruction on the defense of compulsion was
reversible error and constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
The evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and,
thus, the conviction should be reversed.

The prosecutorfs prejudicial remarks during

trial is required.
closing

argument,

At the very least, a new

the

improper

admission

of

Mr.

Dunn's

prior

conviction, the erroneous admission of the bullets, the improper
admission of the photograph, and the failure of Mr. Dunn's counsel
to

request

critical

jury

instructions

is

each,

taken

alone,

sufficiently prejudicial to undermine confidence in the conviction
given

the

weakness

and

evidence against Mr. Dunn.

circumstantial

nature

of

the

State's

The cumulative effect of those errors

leaves no question that Mr. Dunn was deprived of a fair trial and
that, at a minimum, a new trial is mandated.
P.2d

State v. Rammel, 721

498, 501-02 (Utah 1986); State v. Coe, 684 P.2d

668, 678

(Wash. 1984); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 743 (Wyo. 1986).
DATED this J 7 ^ d a y of November, 1990.
W A T K ^ S & SAPERSTEIN

David B. Vfyatkiss
Debra J. Moore
Mary J. Woodhead
Attorneys for Petitioner
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I herewith certify that four copies of the attached BRIEF
OF APPELLANT ROBERT W. DUNN was caused to be served upon:
Paul R. Van Dam
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
by hand delivery this 5**~ day of November, 1990.
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R. Don B r o w
til
JAIJ 19 PHft:kS
Sevier County Attorney
County Courthouse
•.LWUPJULSCN.CLCF::?
:
Richfield, Utah 84701
"2264*7MU*Z~Tri
Telephone: (801) 896-6812
$> j£Un'
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
1

*

Plaintiff,>

•

vs.

:

ROBERT W. DUNN

:

Defendant.»

•

JUDGMENT

Criminal No. 789

The above-captioned matter having come before the
Court on the 14th day of January, 1981 for sentencing, and
the Court having entertained the arguments of R. Don Brown,
Sevier County Attorney, representing the State of Utah; Marcus
Taylor, attorney for the Defendant, and having heard from
the Defendant personally and being apprised of no further
impediment to sentencing %
NOW THEREFORE regarding Count I for which the
jury returned a verdict of Guilty of Murder in the Second
Degree, a First Degree Felony, the Defendant is sentenced
to serve a term in the Utah State Prison of 5 years to life;
With regard to Count II for which the jury returned
a verdict of Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping, a Capital Felony,
and for which the jury was unable to agree as to the sentence
to be imposed, the Count, on the 6th day of January, ordered
the Defendant to serve a prison term of life at the Utah
State Prison; such sentence to be served concurrently with
the sentence for Count I.
The Prison Officials are advised that the Defendant
is apprehensive Acrfffhis l i f e ^ S ^ a ^ s u l t of threats received.
DAJEITthia^Uth day of JanuarK 1981.
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jd

INSTRUCTION NO.

Under the law, an accused person is not guilty
of an offense if he engaged in the proscribed conduct because
he was coerced to do so by u^e or threatened imminent use
of unlawful physical force upon him, which force or threatened
force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
not have resisted.
The defense of compulsion provided by this section
i

shall be unavailable to the person who intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is
probable that he will be subjected to duress.
If you find under all of the facts of this case
that the Defendant was coerced as herein defined, you must
find him not guilty.
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Heeding the Call:
Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14

Kenneth R. Wallentine*

Any defense lawyer who fails to raise [state
constitutional arguments] and relies solely on parallel
provisions under the federal constitution . . . should
be guilty of legal malpractice.1
This bold statement, by Justice Robert E. Jones of the Oregon
Supreme Court, is echoed by the justices and judges of Utah
courts.2

Despite numerous and explicit invitations to brief Utah

constitutional provisions,3 and a demonstrated willingness to reach
state constitutional questions,4 practitioners "continue to ignore"5
*
Kenneth R. Wallentine is a member of the Utah Bar and is
employed at the Utah Court of Appeals. The author wishes to thank
the Hon. Christine M. Durham for her editorial suggestions, and
Tracey Panek for research contributions.
1.
State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 365, 667 P.2d
(1983)(Jones, J., concurring).

996, 1013

2.
See, e.g.. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("it
is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state
constitutional questions").
While this article is necessarily
confined to discussion of Utah's constitution, the analytical
models and source material cited may be applied equally to any
state constitution.
3.
See generally, Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah
B.J. 25 (Nov. 1989).
4.
See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261
(Utah 1986) (Durham, J., concurring on Utah constitution, article
I & V grounds); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987)

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the courts' admonitions.

This delinquency hinders development of

Utah constitutional law. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court
of Appeals have noted that they will limit their constitutional
analysis to the theories presented and briefed.6
One wonders how the bar can so cavalierly reject direction by
the state's supreme court.

Perhaps, upon reconsideration, this

failure is duef not to an attitude of indifference, rather to
ignorance.

At a recent

seminar,

a prosecutor

from a large

metropolitan county attorney's office called upon the speaker, a
justice of the Utah Supreme Court, to promulgate a consistent model
of state constitutional analysis, complaining that attorneys did
not know what the court wanted.7

To be sure, the responsibility

(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting); State v. Hygh, 711
P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); American
Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985) (Durham, J., for
the majority, relies upon state constitution's self-incrimination
provision, articles I & XII; Zimmerman, J., concurring suggests an
article I, section 14 analysis).
5.

State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).

6.
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). See
also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1257 n.2 (Utah 1987) ; State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-6 (Utah 1986); cf. State v. Hygh 711 P.2d
264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (arguments for
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions should
be considered if made) ; < M M H f c W P > ^ E B N E M M | B M d ^
^ ^ ^ 0 l ^ f e l W i M I H W H V P H H P f M M 9 9 ) ; State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
326 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (casual references to the state
constitution are insufficient to require state constitutional
analysis).
7.
The question was posed at the Seventh Annual Conference on
State and Local Government, Government and Legal Politics Society,
J. Reuben Clark Law School. Justice Christine Durham of the Utah
Supreme Court graciously invited the attorney to become familiar
with state constitutional argument.
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for

educating

this

prosecutor

and

his

colleagues

in

state

constitutional analysis rests primarily with them and not the
courts. Much of the blame must lie with our nation's law schools.
Many scholars and judges have lamented the substantial bias toward
federal constitutional law taught in law schools.8

Utah's two

schools have only just initiated courses in state constitutional
law,9 despite an invitation to do so nearly a decade ago.10
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution11 guarantees
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, paralleling the
language of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Until recently, the Utah Supreme Court and other Utah courts have

8.
Douglas, State Judicial Activism — The New Role for State
Bills of Rights. 12 Suffolk L. Rev. 1147 (1978). Douglas is a
justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire and has decried the
federal bias carried by state court judges' law clerks, inculcated
in "federally oriented law schools." He also laments the lack of
textual materials for courses in state constitutional law. The
first, and only, text for state constitutional studies was
published in late 1988. Williams, State Constitutional Lav, Cases
and Materials, ACIS (1988).
9.
At the J. Reuben Clark Law School a course in state
constitutional law was taught for the first time in Winter 1990,
although many state constitutional issues had been explored in
state government classes in preceding years by Professor Eugene B.
Jacobs.
At the University of Utah, Justice Christine Durham
teaches a seminar in state constitutional law, also begun this
year.
10. See Fordham, Some Observations
Federalism. 58 N.C. L. Rev. 293 (1980).
11.

Upon

Uneasy

American

Article I, § 14 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

faithfully followed federal court interpretations of the fourth
amendment in construing the protections of article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution.12

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court stated

only two years ago that it had "never drawn distinctions between
the

protections

provisions.

afforded

Ratherf

the

by

the

[c]ourt

respective
has

always

protections afforded to be one and the same."13

constitutional
considered

the

However, in the

same breath the court hastened to state that "choosing to give the
Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to
be an appropriate method for insulating the state's citizens from
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth
amendment by the federal courts."14 Earlier this year, in State v.
Larocco,15 the Utah Supreme Court announced that the court would
eliminate

certain exceptions to the

fourth amendment

warrant

requirement in favor of a simpler test under article lf section

12. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986);
State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986).
13. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988).
In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Zimmerman notes that this statement is
mere dictum and stands squarely at odds with the intent of footnote
number 8 in the majority opinion.
14. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (citations
omitted). See also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 104 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (Billings, J., dissenting) ("[s]tate courts responding
to the confusing and restrictive new federal interpretations are
relying on an analysis of their own search and seizure provisions
to expand constitutional protection beyond those mandated by the
fourth amendment, often directly avoiding applicable United States
Supreme Court precedent").
15.

794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
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14.16

The New

York Court of Appeals has

stated

a similar

justification in departing from a uniform construction of identical
search and seizure language, commenting that M[fjourth [a]mendment
rules governing police conduct have been muddied, and judicial
supervision of the warrant process diluted."17
Members of the Utah bar must go forward with their state
constitutional law educations and respond to judicial invitations.
Professor Hans Linde, former chief justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court and a noted writer on state constitutional analysis, has
stated that "independent argument under the state [constitution]
takes homework —
to analysis.

in texts, in history, in alternative approaches

It is not enough to ask the state court to reject a

[United States] Supreme Court opinion on a comparable federal
clause merely because one prefers the opposite result."13 It is the
intent

of

this

article

successfully brief
constitution.19

to

search and

demonstrate

how

attorneys

may

seizure issues under the Utah

Part I discusses methods of state constitutional

16. Id. at 469-70. The court, speaking through Justice Durham,
held that it would first apply the expectation of privacy concept
as a "threshold criterion for determining whether article l,
section 14 is applicable." Id. at 469. If applicable, the court
would then determine whether the challenged search could be
justified by safety concerns or to prevent the destruction of
evidence.
17. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907,
501 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1986).
18. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States1 Bills
of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 392 (1980).
19. While this article focuses on the unique historical, social
and legal factors impacting on a search and seizure analysis under
the Utah Constitution, the approach is equally adaptable to
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

research and provides a brief introduction to theories of state
constitutional

interpretation.

Part II introduces historical

considerations impacting on Utah search and seizure analysis.
Finally, Part III compares analysis of article I, section 14 of the
Utah constitution with selected other state constitutions.

I.

Methods of State Constitutional Analysis

In State v. Jewett.20 Justice Hayes of the Vermont Supreme
Court took counsel to task for making cursory references to the
state constitution and failing to brief such issues.

Beyond this

admonition, however, the court remanded the case with instructions
to

counsel

to

adequately

brief

state

constitutional

issues.

Justice Hayes then noted that "we who have the mind to criticize
must have the heart to help."21 With that preface, he embarked upon
a tutorial theme for state constitutional research and argument.
The Utah Supreme Court has embraced Justice Hayes1

instructive

opinion.
The Jewett court suggested the use of four principle sources
of

analytical

material.

First,

the

history

of

the

state

constitutional analysis under any state constitution.
20. 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985). See also State v. Hunt, 91
N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring).
21.

500 A.2d at 234.

22.

State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).
6
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constitution, especially legislative history, must be considered.
Second, the textual construction
analyzed.24

of the provision should be

Third, comparison with decisions of other states'

courts construing their state constitutional provisions of similar
or identical language may be helpful.25

Finally, "Brandeis brief"

sociological materials may be utilized.26
considered

in

following

sections,

These approaches are

with

their

particular

applicability to Utah's search and seizure provision.
Of

course,

constitutional

before

issues

an

reaching
attorney

either
should

federal
resort

or

state

first

to

administrative regulations and state statute.27 The attorney must
consider whether a challenged search violates a state statute.28
For example, Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-15 states that a "peace
officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." This

23. 500 A.2d at 236. See also, American Fork City v. Cosgrove,
701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985) (relying on history of Utah Constitution,
art. I, § 12).
24.

500 A.2d at 236-37.

25.

500 A.2d at 237.

26.

Id.

27. See generally, Davis & Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah. 3 B.Y.U. J.
Pub. L. 357, 359-65 (1989).
28. See generally. State ex rel T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934
(1983), rev'd. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
7
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statutory restraint may arguably be more stringent than the fourth
amendment,

as Utah

law requires

"reasonable

necessary prerequisite to making a stop.29

suspicion" as a

The fourth amendment

does not always so require. While the United States Supreme Court
has required "some quantum of individual suspicion" as a general
prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure, it has ruled
that the fourth amendment imposes no "irreducible requirement" of
such suspicion.30
One frequent criticism of state constitutional decisions is
that identical provisions of a state constitution and the federal
constitution are construed differently, causing confusion at the
bar.31 However, the additional taxation on an advocated abilities
ought not give cause to simplifying the rules for simplicity sake.
It is not yet clear which analytical approach32 will be adopted as
29. See also. State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057
(1988) (Idaho constitution requires reasonable suspicion to conduct
a statutorily authorized sobriety enforcement roadblock).
30. The Supreme Court has carved out a few established and welldelineated exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
dealing with airport security, zoning violation enforcement, border
control activity, frisk searches and warrantless administrative
searches of commercial property. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 3 09 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
31. See, e.g. . State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 365, 667 P.2d 996,
1012 (1983) (Jones, J., dissenting); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 119, 545 P.2d 272, 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1976)
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
32. Three principle approaches have been taken in state
constitutional analysis: the primacy model, the interstitial model
and the dual sovereignty approach. See Utter, Swimming in the Jaws
of the Crocodile:
State Court Comment on Federal Issues When
8
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the rule in Utah courts.

In several instances the Utah Supreme

Court has noted that the decision of the case comports with both
state

and

analysis.33

federal

constitutional

provisions

under

parallel

However, dicta in several opinions hints that the

Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 Tex. L. Rev*
1027 (1985). See also Developments in the Law—Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights. 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982). The
primacy model treats the state constitution as the fundamental
wellspring of rights.
Federal decisions and their underlying
analysis are regarded as persuasive, although not controlling,
authority. The interstitial model first calls for analysis under
the federal constitution; if the right claimed is guaranteed under
the federal constitution, no further inquiry is needed. However,
if the right is not federally-assured, the search continues in the
state constitution for a possible source. See State v. Hunt, 91
N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
The dual sovereignty approach
follows a dual analysis of state and federal constitutions, even
when the state constitutional provision may be authoritative and
directly resolve the issue. See State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450
A.2d 336 (1982) . The dual sovereignty approach has been criticized
as a method of evading both state populist review, by relying on
federal grounds, and federal review, by relying on independent and
adequate state grounds. See Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and
No Anchor—Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6
Hastings Const. L.Q. 975 (1980) . This criticism has been ably
refuted in Utter, supra (1985).
33. See State v. Nelson 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986) (admission
of hearsay statements not a violation of the right to confrontation
under either U.S. Const, amend. VI or Utah Const, art. I, § 12);
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah 1986) (rule that
admission of out-of-court statements under the circumstances of the
case created no confrontation problem is the same under federal and
state constitution); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah
1986) (interpreting in parallel fashion the speedy trial provisions
contained in Utah Const, art. I, § 12 and U.S. Const, amend. VI);
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 265-67 (Utah 1986) (holding that the
"Utah and the federal cruel and unusual punishment provisions apply
to this case in the same fashion", and equal protection analysis
is the same under both constitutions) ; State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,
267 (Utah 1985) (holding that, as under federal law, inventory
searches are permitted by Utah Const, art. I, § 14), State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 1984) (in the context of the
instant case "article I, § 9 [of the Utah Constitution] does not
give the defendant more extensive protections than those afforded
by the eighth amendment [of the federal constitution]); State v.
Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-06 (Utah 1984) (ineffective assistance
9
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primacy model may be appropriate for Utah jurisprudence.34

While

some may be critical of the apparent confusion,35 able members of
the bar should take the opportunity to advocate analysis most
favorable to their clients.
Notwithstanding the short supply of state constitutional law
texts,

there

are

ample

constitutional theory.36

research

sources

applying

state

Some limited history is available for

of counsel analysis same under Utah Const, art. I, § 12 and U.S.
Const, amend. VI.); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 n. 5 (Utah
1984) cert, denied. 466 U.S. 942 ("[The Utah Supreme Court]
recognizes no distinction between the protection against ex post
facto laws provided by the Utah and the United States
Constitutions"); McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 323 (Utah 1983)
(the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. const, amend. V and of
the Utah Const, art I. § 12 "have the same content").
34. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988); State
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring);
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Billings,
J., dissenting).
35. See, Note, The Utah Supreme Court
Constitution. 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 321.

and

the

Utah

State

36. See generally. Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law. 20
Rutgers L.J. 877 (1989); Williams, State Constitutional Law, Cases
and Materials ACIS (1988) ; Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States;
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535 (1986); Note, The Use of
State Constitutional Provisions in Criminal Defense After Michigan
v. Long, 65 Neb. L. Rev. 605 (1986); Developments in state
Constitutional Theory and State Courts (B. McGraw, ed. 1985);
Carson, "Last Things Last:'1 A Methodological Approach to Legal
Argument in State Courts, 19 Williamette L. Rev. 641 (1983);
Developments in the Law—Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324 (1982); Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489
(1977); Note, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights.
8 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 271 (1973). See also How to Research
State Constitutional Law. Nat'l L. J., May 12, 1984, Special
Insert.
Additionally, the National Association of Attorneys
General has recently inaugurated an annual journal entitled
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law.
10
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study of the Utah Constitution,

although nothing like the volumes

treating its federal counterpart. Notwithstanding the comparative
scarcity of material, one must remember that

,f

[t]he imaginative

lawyer is still the fountainhead of our finest jurisprudence."38

II.

A Historical Approach

Utah's constitutions,39 seven in number, have had a contorted
history

which

has

not

been

well-documented.

constitution was cooked up in back rooms
filled)40 by early Mormon leaders.
of Deseret,

Utah's

Utah's

first

(not likely smoke-

The Constitution of the State

first constitution, published

in 1849 in

37. See, e.g., Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret,
29 B.Y.U. Studies 7 (1989); Swindler, Sources and Documents of
United States Constitutions (1979) ; Flynn, Federalism and Viable
State Government — The History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah
L. Rev. 311; Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State
Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 326; Hickman, Utah Constitutional
Law 40 (1954) (unpublished doctoral dissertation available at the
University of Utah Library).
38. 500 A.2d at 237. The approaches suggested in Jewett do not
represent the full scope of analysis. In Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d
494, 503 (Alaska 1975), the court cited the lifestyle of the
typical Alaskan to justify broad privacy protections, see also.
Woods & Rhode, Inc. v. State Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska
1977) (the Alaska Constitution, article 1, section 22, guarantee
of privacy protects against warrantless administrative searches).
39. Constitutions were drafted and submitted to Congress in 1849,
1856, 1862, 1872, 1882, and 1887. After Utah was approved for
admission to the Union in 1894, the official state constitution was
approved by voters on November 5, 1895. Utah was formally admitted
to the Union on January 4, 1896. That constitution was and remains
the only official constitution the State of Utah. Thus, reference
to constitutions prior to that of 1896 is to the various
constitutions proposed by the territorial government as part of the
ongoing efforts to gain statehood.
40. One of the tenets of the Mormon faith requires its members to
abstain from the use of tobacco products.
11
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f
Kanesville, Iowa, was accompanied by notes of a constitutional
convention that were complete fabrication.41

The election of a

I
house of representatives and constitutional convention and records
and annals were invented, a secret known only to early Mormon
leaders.

A plethora of

inconsistencies

is evident

in the
i

43

record.

A search of early Mormon diaries reveals no mention of

any gathering or convention on the claimed dates.44 In fact, the
"clerk" of the convention, reported that there was a "great wolf

i
hunt" on the opening day of the convention, but no mention of the
convention.45

Several leaders, delegates to the convention, list

many detailed activities in their personal diaries for the dates

i
of the convention — events taking them all over the valley — yet
none mention the convention.46 The Constitution of the state of
Deseret was based largely on the Iowa constitution of 1846.47 Its
i

deceitful history came to light only after nearly 140 years, with
the historical research of a Brigham Young University scholar, who
meticulously demonstrated that the group allegedly assembled to
i

41. Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret. 29 B.Y.U.
Studies 7 (1989).
42.

Id. at 12-15.

43.

See id. at 11.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 11-12.

47.

Id. at 15.
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draft a constitution could not have been gathered at the time and
place recorded.48
Despite its questionable origin, the first constitution was
well-regarded and has been termed a "model state constitution."49
It included a provision protecting against unreasonable search and
seizure, as did each subsequent constitution.50

Unfortunately, no

direct legislative history is available concerning the decision to
include this provision.

The first appearance in the official

annals is found in the report of the constitutional convention of
1895.

Article I, section 14 was mentioned only in brief passing.

The entire record appears as follows:

"The Chairman:

Gentlemen,

we will take up section 14. Section 14 was read and passed without
amendment."51
Utah's subsequent proposed constitutions were based on the
Constitution of the State of Deseret, with its liberal use of the
Iowa constitution, and textual loans from several other state

48.

Id. at 7.

49. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government — The History
of Utah's Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 324. Even as late
as 1966, Flynn, a professor of law at the University of Utah, and
others, had no clue as to the false birth of the first
constitution.
50. The provision protecting against unreasonable search and
seizure was placed at the end of the Constitution of the State of
Deseret in the eighth article. In the constitution of 1856 the
bill of rights was placed at the beginning as article II, following
the article which defined the proposed state boundaries. In 1862
the boundary provision was eliminated and the declaration of rights
became the first article, where it remained.
51. Official Report of the
Convention 1895, 319 (1898).

Proceedings

and

Debates
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of

the

constitutions.

New York,2 Illinois,53 Nevada54 and Washington55

served as models for Utah constitutions.
served

as patterns, and

early Mormon

As these constitutions
leaders were generally

familiar with constitutional law,56 it is reasonable to consider
the

legislative history

constitutions.
decisions

The

construing

and subsequent construction

following
those

section

compares

constitutions1

search

the
and

of these
judicial
seizure

provisions.
One of the analytical

approaches suggested

in State v.

Jewett,57 and endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court,58 focuses on the
52. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention: 1895, 1066 (1898) (section 8 taken verbatim from the
New York constitution). ^ Considering that Joseph Smith, the founder
of Mormonism, was a long-time New York citizen and generally
reputed to be a student of constitutional law, see infra note 56,
the New York constitution may have been the first to be considered
by Smith and his associates in their discussions on government.
53.

Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 42-43 (1954).

54.

Deseret News, Feb. 28, 1872.

55. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention: 1895, 1067, 1108, 1125 (1898) (sections taken from the
Washington constitution).
56. The founding prophet of the Mormon Church, Joseph Smith, was
a homespun constitutional scholar. Smith, Teachings of the Prophet
Joseph Smith 326 (1940); Roberts, History of the Church, 6:57. He
spent many hours teaching constitutional principles to his
subordinates who later became ecclesiastical and political leaders.
See Quinn, 20 B.Y.U. Studies 163 (1980).
Smith's personal
influence remained strong; early settlers selected his uncle, John
Smith, as the first president of the settlement in Salt Lake
Valley. Smith was also the Mormon patriarch, a position held to
this day only by blood descendants of Joseph Smith. Morgan, The
State of Deseret, 10 (U.S.U. 1987).
57.

146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985).

58.

State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).
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social history of the drafters of the state constitution.
again, Utah has a distinctive history in this regard.

Once

The early

settlers in Utah had experienced great deprivations of their civil
liberties.

Not only had they been driven from Ohiof Missouri and

Illinois by armed mobs, but later became victims to federal
authorities sent by Washington to maintain a firm hand on the
territory's theocracy. Once established in the Territory of Utah,
early

Utahns

were

subjected

to

two

government

attempts

to

extinguish the practice of polygamy in the territory.59 One author
commented that the Mormon's persecution lead to a "unique sentiment
[]

among

the

members

of

the

Mormon

Church

and

the

state

constitutional convention [delegates] regarding personal privacy,
sanctity of the home, and the separate provinces of the individual
and the state."60
As part of the anti-polygamy enforcement, the fourth amendment
was often

forgotten by U.S. marshals, other law enforcement

officers and courts.

Early accounts tell of federal marshals who

59. Firmage, Zion in the Courts, 129, 160 (1988). Mormons did
not publicly confess the practice of polygamy until 1852, although
it had been a component of Mormon society for some time. Id. at
13 0.
Firmage details two distinct periods of anti-polygamy
legislation and enforcement. The first began as early as 1854,
when efforts were made to disqualify polygamists from eligibility
for homesteading. IcJ. at 131. Transition into the second period
was signaled by passage of the Edmunds Act, 22 Stat. 30 (1882).
With the issue of slavery settled by the Civil War, Congress was
now free to pass a flurry of anti-polygamy legislation. Firmage
details the impact of these measures. See id. 160-209.
60. Panek, A Peculiar People and Their Constitution: The Culture
and Times of 19th Century Utah, 6, unpublished manuscript in
possession of the author. (Hereinafter "Panek") . Ms. Panek has
conducted exhaustive research into accounts of searches by law
enforcement officials in territorial days.
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saw little need for the aid of search warrants.61
entitled

"How

They

Do

It," the

Deseret

News

In an article
described

a
I

characteristic raid on a suspected polygamist's home:
The deputy U.S. Marshals first appeared at the residence
of Mr. Goff, on the east side of the river. Mrs. Goff
met them at the door, and to their queries replied that
her husband was not at home.
They then demanded
admittance to the house, and Mrs. Goff inquired whether
they were authorized to do so. To this Deputy J.W.
Franks replied insolently that the only search warrant
he needed was an axe with which to break in the door.
The deputies then searched the house . . . .62

i

i

Night time searches, viewed with fastidious scrutiny by courts
since the beginnings of the common law,63 were not uncommon and
executed without any showing of particularized need to search at
i

night. Several women complained that officers would appear at any
time of night and require them to awaken families and conduct the
marshals through the house by lamplight.64 The nocturnal searches
prompted public outcry, as evidenced in angry editorials.

One

Utahn asked whether "officers of the law, without resistance, or
request for admission, and without a warrant, have a right to break
into citizens' houses at any hour of the day or night . . . without

61.

17 Cong. Rec. 3138 (1886).

Courts, 227

See also Firmage, Zion in the

(1988).

62. Deseret News Weekly. Jan. 20, 1886 at 1, cited in Panek, supra
note 60 at 6.
63. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961); 2 Hale, Pleas
of the Crown 113 (1847).
64. Panek, supra note 60 at 11, 12. See also Deseret News Weekly.
June 10, 1885 at 1.
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having a warrant for that person[']s arrest or even knowing his
name."65 To date, the question of standards for night time searches
is an unsettled area of Utah law.66
The marshals' searches were not limited to the Mormons' homes.
Clever deputies soon figured out where most Mormons could be found
on any given Sunday. Officers began to attend church services, but
not to commune with their Maker.

One account relates how not-so-

clever deputies were outfoxed when they entered a religious service
intending to effect an arrest.

"The whole congregation arose and

the marshals were surrounded while two of the wanted men escaped
through a window and got away safely."67
greater success.

Other officers enjoyed

Perhaps inspired by the Mormon practice of

issuing calls to service in public meetings, one marshal paraded
to the front of the church and subpoenaed men from the pulpit. As
an amazed congregation watched, he also took two of their number
into custody.68
Evidence of polygamy became harder to obtain, as polygamists
both attempted to comply with applicable laws by avoiding contact
with their wives, and became more canny in hiding the activities
leading to conviction.

The response of the courts was to reduce

65. Deseret News Weekly, Jan. 27, 1886 at 26, cited in Panek,
supra note 60 at 17.

67. Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground. 51 Utah
Hist. Q., 133, 142 (1983).
68. Deseret News Weekly. May 20, 1885, at 1, cited in Panek, supra
note 60 at 12.
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the quantum of evidence necessary for a conviction

and to offer

a hefty bonus to deputies who arrested suspected polygamists.70
Marshals practiced

the time-honored

tactic of enlisting paid

informants. Informants also performed night time searches, without
the benefit of warrant or commission.71

In an early gathering of

delegates to the constitutional convention, Mormon leader B.H.
Roberts complained that marshals "employ[ed] spies and spotters."72
Abuses by federal officers were not limited to offensive
searches. Women were seized and incarcerated in conditions deemed
wretched even in that day.

It was not uncommon for federal judges

to jail mothers with their young infants.73

One tiny cell was

shared by six women and three infants.74
Against this background of unprecedented federal judicial
abuse, arises a theory that the search and seizure provision in
the Utah constitution was included as a deliberate, considered act,

69.

See United States v. Harris, 17 P. 75 (Utah 1888).

70. Brown, The United States Marshals in Utah Territory to 1896.
144 (unpublished thesis available in the Utah State Historical
Society Library), cited in Panek, supra note 60 at 13.
71.

Panek, supra note 60 at 8.

72. Mormon Protest Against Injustice. An Appeal for Constitutional
and Religious Liberty 45, Full Report of the Mass Meeting Held in
Salt Lake City, May 2, 1885, by John Irvine, published by Jos.
Hyrum Parry & Co., cited in Panek, supra note 60 at 26.
73.

See, e.g.. Ex parte Harris, 5 P. 129 (Utah 1884).

74. 19 Cong. Rec. 9232 (1888).
Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, of
contemporary fame, was jailed for nearly 2 years under a similar
contempt of court provision. However, Dr. Morgan's conditions of
imprisonment which brought many Americans to rage, were palatial
compared to the federal penitentiary.
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rather than part of a wholesale importation of constitutional
language.

In an official pronouncement, the Mormon Church stated

These [raids] are no fiction but verifiable facts that
we have had to put up with . . . . These errors have to
be corrected, and it is our duty, so far as the law lays
in our power, as it is the duty of all honorable men in
these United States, to sustain the Constitution thereof
and to oppose in all legitimate ways any infringement of
that instrument.75
A quick glance at the roles of delegates to the various Utah
constitutional conventions reveals that the large majority of
delegates were prominent religious leaders, of the sort likely to
share the views of the church leadership, and in any event,
faithfully espouse the official position.
Drafters

of

Utah's

early

constitutions

were

intimately

familiar with egregious searches of the sort unknown since the days
of King George.

Reason dictates that the drafters were acutely

concerned with providing protection and remedies against unlawful
searches and seizures.76

The majority of the drafters were men who

75. First Presidency Message to General Conference [of the L.D.S.
Church], Deseret News Weekly. April 14, 1886, at 196, cited in
Panek, supra note 60 at 15.
76. Legislation aimed at the Mormon practice of polygamy had
already been introduced in 1856, the first of many such efforts.
Larson, Government. Politics and Conflict, in Utah's History 244
(R. Poll. ed. U.S.U. Press 1989). Notwithstanding, the Civil War
proved a boon to the Mormons insofar as the federal government
concentrated
efforts
elsewhere.
President
Lincoln,
in
characteristic fashion, stated "You tell Brigham Young, that if he
will leave me alone, I'll leave him alone." 1^. Notwithstanding,
it is interesting to note that after the federal anti-polygamy
efforts began, the constitutional drafters placed the bill of
rights at the beginning of the constitution, rather than at the
end. See supra, note 56. Perhaps a subtle message was thereby
intended. However, it may also be that the drafters noted that
many contemporary state constitutions had placed their declaration
of rights at the beginning, and merely followed suit.
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had firsthand knowledge of abusive searches.

John H. Smith, a

Mormon apostle and President of the constitutional convention of
1895, practiced polygamy and had been the target of marshal's
searches.78

Several members of the subcommittee selected to draft

the Declaration of Rights for the 1985 constitution had publicly
protested the search and seizure practices of federal marshals.79
Some may persuade that article I, section 14 is merely part
of a pro forma incorporation of other state's bills of rights.
Certainly the drafters had at hand other state constitutions, and
desired to use any means or device which might make the proposed
constitution and application for statehood more palatable to a
hostile congress.

However, the only objective evidence supporting

this quick conclusion is found in the similar language of article
I, section 14 language with like provisions.

Contrasted to this,

again one must recall the drafters' experiences with abusive
searches.

One

might

also, however, point

to

the

lack

of

legislative history and wonder why the drafters would have remained
silent about the adoption of a search and seizure provision.
Perhaps the response to such concerns is in the demonstrated need
77. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 Utah Hist. Q. 95, 100
(1957).
78. White, The Making of the Convention President: The Political
Education of John Henrv Smith. 39 Utah Hist. Q. 351, 357 (1971).
79.

Panek, supra note 60 at 27-28.

80. The tortured efforts on the road to statehood for Utah are
beyond the scope of this article. Sufficed it to say that both
internal turmoil and animosity toward the practice of polygamy
delayed Utah's admission. See generally, Firmage, Zion in the
Courts 125-262 (1988).
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to minimize protests and meekly approach Congress with statehood
petitions, freshly remembering not only the marshals' bedroom
incursions, but also the vitriolics of a Congress hostile to Utah
statehood.81

One should also consider that the abuses of federal

officers were common knowledge to all Utahns, and not topics
requiring explicit memorialization in the convention notes.
Article
sensitivity

III
to

providing that

provides

freedom

evidence

from

of

searches

the

of

drafter's

home

and

acute

property,

,f

[n]o inhabitant of this State shall ever be

molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of
religious

belief

.

.

.

.,|82

While

several

other

states'

constitutions contain guarantees of religious liberty,83 Utah's
provision is unique insofar as it proscribes disturbance of person
or property.

This language appeared in the constitution of 1896,

and had no predecessor in earlier constitutions. It is in addition
to language contained in the declaration of rights which assures
freedom to worship according to conscience, a provision contained

81. See Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government — The
History of Utah's Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 319-22.
82. One commentator has noted that "[a]lmost every imaginable
protection for religious freedom" was included in the Utah
constitution.
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State
Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 326, 331. The Utah constitution
is unique in its prohibition of any church, a purely private group,
to interfere with or dominate the affairs of the state. Utah
Constitution, article I, § 4.
83. See, e.g., Constitution of the State of New York, art. I, §
3; Constitution of the State of Idaho, art. I, § 4.
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in most state constitutions.

The Supreme Court of Montana has

noted that its search and seizure clause, identical to the fourth
amendment, must be construed to give greater protections against
unreasonable search and seizure when considered in tandem with a
separate clause prohibiting infringement on the right of privacy.85
In the absence of an unambiguous statement of the drafter's
intent, an advocate should argue the historical interpretation most
favorable to her client.

The parallel language of the state and

federal search and seizure provisions must not deter the effective
advocate.

Justice Zimmerman has unequivocally noted that M[t]he

federal law as it currently exists is certainly not the only
permissible interpretation of the search and seizure protections
contained in the Utah Constitution. . . . [s]ound argument may be
made in favor of positions at variance with the current federal law
respecting both the scope of the individual's right to be free from
warrantless searches and seizures and the remedy for any violation

84. The constitution of 1849 contained a strong and detailed
provision for religious freedom in the declaration of rights.
Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. VIII, § 3.
This
provision carried through in subsequent constitutions.
See
Constitution of Deseret, art. II, § 3 (1856); Constitution of the
State of Deseret, art. II, § 3 (1862); Constitution of the State
of Deseret, art. I, § 4 (1872); Constitution of the State of Utah,
art. I, § 4 (1887).
85. State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977). The
Montana Constitution, art. II, § 10 provides "Right of privacy.
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of
a free society and shall not be infringed without a showing of a
compelling state interest." See also. State v. Brackman, 178 Mont.
105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978) (compelling state interest, not probable
cause, is the standard required to infringe on privacy expectations
in light of construction of both sections).
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of that right."86

The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that

"[Utah] may construe its own constitution more narrowly than the
federal constitution even though the provisions involved may be
similar."87
William

This is by no means a maverick view; former Justice

Brennan has recognized

that identical provisions may

legitimately be construed as offering greater or lesser protection
An

than their federal counterparts.

86. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman,
J., concurring).
87. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981). See also
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (citations
omitted) ("choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for
insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts").
88. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 499-500 (1977). Many state courts
have given a different construction to their textually parallel
constitutional provisions. See generally. State v. Johnson, 68
N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520
P.2d 51 (1974); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure
in 1984;
Death of the Phoenix, in Developments in State
Constitutional Theory and State Courts 166 (B. McGraw, ed. 1985)
[Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court termed the resurgence
of state constitutional law a "phoenix-like resurrection." Mosk,
The State Courts, in American Law; The Third Century 213, 216 (B.
Schwartz, ed. 1976)]; Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court. 62 Ky. L.J.
873 (1975).
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III.

Constitutional Analysis:

A Comparative Approach

An additional analytical method discussed by Justice Hayes in
Jewett

focuses

on

the

"sibling

state

approach."

This

is

particularly appropriate when drafters examined and considered
another state's constitution.

As mentioned above, several other

states' constitutions served as models for the drafters of the Utah
constitution.91

This group, Iowa, Illinois, Nevada, New York and

Washington, provides a logical body of jurisdictions against which
to compare Utah's search and seizure provision.

While it should

be remembered that precise legislative history detailing the origin
of article I, section 14, is lacking,92 logic dictates that the
Iowa,

Illinois

and

New

York

constitutions

are

particularly

important, as early drafters had access and familiarity with these
constitutions before drafting the first Utah constitution.93

The

Nevada constitution must also be considered, as it may have been
the source of the current text of Utah's search and seizure
provision.94
89.

A second group ripe for comparison are those states

State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (1985).

90. See Heath v. Sears, 123 N.H. 512, 526, 464 A.2d 288, 296, cf. ,
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering, 471 A.2d 195, 200 (R.I. 1984).
91.

See supra notes 49-55.

92.

See supra note 51.

93.

See supra notes 52-53.

94. The declaration of rights in early constitutions contained a
simple statement that "[t]he people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches
and seizures." Constitution of the State of Deseret, art. VIII,
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which also have search and seizure provisions which are textually
identical or similar to the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution.95
New York courts have consistently interpreted the New York
Constitution as offering significantly greater protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures than does the fourth amendment.
Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution contains two
paragraphs,

the

first

of

which

is

identical

to

the

fourth

amendment.97

That identical provision was construed in People v.

§ 6 (1849) . That text was modified to its present state, which
matches the language of the fourth amendment, in 1872.
The
constitutional drafters of 1872 had ordered 125 copies of the
Nevada constitution. Deseret News. February 28f 1872. The Nevada
search and seizure clause is found in the Constitution of the State
of Nevada, art I, § 18. Not only was the Nevada constitution from
a neighboring state, but it had recently been approved by congress.
The Nevada constitution was adopted in September of 1964, and
Nevada was admitted to the union on October 31, 1864. Hickman
notes that it was used as the principal reference tool for the
drafting of the 1872 constitution. Hickman, Utah Constitutional
Law, 49 (1954).
95. The text of all fifty state constitutions may be found in
Constitutions of the United States: National and State (F. Grad.
ed., 2d ed. 1982). This multi-volume set also contains and index
of states1 bills of rights, Fundamental Liberties & Rights, a 50state Index (B. Sachs, ed. 1980) .
96. See generally. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1986); People v. Johnson, 66
N.Y.2d 398, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439 (1985); People v.
Langen, 60 N.Y.2d 170, 469 N.Y.S.2d 44, 456 N.E.2d 1167 (1983);
People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 452 N.E.2d 1224
(1983).
97. The second paragraph of article I, section 12, addresses
electronic surveillance, and closely parallels an applicable
federal statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988).
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Gokey.

to not allow automatic searches of containers within the

arrestee's control

area, rejecting

the United

Court's holding in New York v. Belton."

States Supreme

The court stated that

warrantless searches are deemed unreasonable under the New York
Constitution unless justified by exigent circumstances.100
In People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,101 the New York high court held
that article I, section 12, requires a more precise standard for
warrants for search and seizure of obscene material.

The United

States Supreme Court had determined that the questioned warrant did
not violate fourth amendment standards.102

The court recognized

that similar provisions in the federal and state constitutions
ought to be subject to a uniform interpretation, then stated that
"[w]hen

weighed

against

the

ability

to

protect

fundamental

constitutional rights, the practical need for uniformity can seldom
be

98.

a

decisive

factor."103

Relying

on

a

totality

of

the

60 N.Y.2d 309, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618, 457 N.E.2d 723 (1983).

99. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court held that
a warrantless search may be conducted of the passenger compartment
of an arrestee's vehicle when he is arrested in the vehicle. Other
state supreme courts have also rejected the Belton rule. See,
e.g. . State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240, (1983)
(vehicle searches contemporaneous to arrest are limited to the
arrestee's reach area; warrant required to search arrestee's
vehicle absent exigent circumstances); State v. Hernandez, 410
So.2d 1381 (La. 1982) (a vehicle search contemporaneous to a lawful
arrest is prohibited under Louisiana constitution, art. 1, § 5).
100. 457 N.E.2d at 724.
101. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556 (1986).
102. New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986).
103. 501 N.E.2d at 561.
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circumstances approach,

the United States Supreme Court had found

that the evidence in the warrant application of the offensive
sexual conduct portrayed in the films adequately compensated for
the police failure to submit evidence that the sexually-explicit
films violated community standards and lacked intrinsic value, and
therefore was not fatal to the warrant.105

The New York Court of

Appeals countered that the clear standard imposed by article I,
section 12 required that the magistrate reviewing the warrant
application consider "all aspects of the information supporting the
application,"106 and found that the lack of evidence that the films
violated

community

standards doomed

the warrant

and required

suppression of the evidence.107
Courts of the other members of the model group for the Utah
constitutions,

Illinois,

and

Iowa

and

Nevada,

have

eschewed

constitutional construction at variance with the federal courts.
The Nevada Supreme Court has paid

little heed to its state

constitution, offering only rare, passing comments.108

Both Iowa109

104. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
105. 475 U.S. at 876-78.
106. 501 N.E.2d at 563.
107. 501 N.E.2d at 564.
108. See Luciano v. Marshall, 95 Nev. 276, 593 P.2d 751 (1979).
109. See State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986)
(provisions identical in scope, import and purpose); but cf.,
Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (U.S. Supreme
Court interpretations are persuasive, but not binding on Iowa
courts).
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and Illinois110 have thus far declined to construe their search and
seizure provisions more broadly than the fourth amendment.
Like New York, many states with search and seizure clauses
which are identical, or nearly identical, to the fourth amendment
have

construed

their

state

constitutions

to

offer

stricter

i
standards of reasonableness.

Many of our western neighbors are

among this group. In State v. Henderson,111 the Idaho Supreme Court
reversed a denial of a suppression order after scrutiny of a
4

sobriety enforcement roadblock under the Idaho constitution, which
is

identical

Constitution.

to

the

fourth

amendment

The court considered

of

the

a state

United

States

statute112 which

authorizes roadblocks to apprehend persons reasonably believed to
be in violation of Idaho law, and found reasonable suspicion to be
a condition precedent to the use of a roadblock. Justice Huntley,
writing

for the majority, stated that the court reached its

conclusion solely on the grounds of the state constitution.113
California has been a leader in application of its state
constitution to criminal law, particularly search and seizure
issues.114

In People v. Lonawill,115 the California Supreme Court

110. People v. Williams, 182 111. App. 3d 598, 131 111. Dec. 189,
538 N.E.2d 564 (1989).
111. 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988).
112. Idaho Code § 19-621 (1988).
113. 756 P.2d at 1063.
114. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,
531 P.2d 1099 (1975).
115. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753 (1975).
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held that arrested persons may not be subjected to a full body
search unless and until the arrestee is actually incarcerated.116
Thus, a person who is arrested and released after signing a promise
to appear or a citation to that effect may not be searched, other
than a pat-down search for weapons.117

This holding rejected the

rules of search incident to arrest established by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson118 and Gustafson v.
Florida.119

The court stated that on questions of individual

liberties, the California Declaration of Rights would be its "first
referent."120
The California Supreme Court has also rejected the rule of
United States v. Miller.121
abandoned

any

expectation

Miller held that bank depositors
of

privacy

of

bank

records

when

transacting business with the bank, thus allowing law enforcement
officials

ready

access

to

bank

account

information.122

The

California court found that a bank customer retains an expectation
of privacy in bank records, and that the disclosure of information

116. 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
117. Id.
118. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
119. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
120. 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
121. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
122. Id. at 442-43.
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through banking transactions was not voluntary, in that banking is
an integral and necessary part of modern life.123
Colorado joined California in rejecting the Miller rule in
Charnes v. DiGiacomo.124

The Colorado Supreme Court conceded that

Miller limited application of the fourth amendment to questions of
expectation

of privacy

in bank records, but stated that the

Colorado constitution, article II, section 7, provides a greater
expectation of privacy than does its textually similar federal
counterpart.125

Also following the California lead,126 Colorado has

employed its state constitution to protect against warrantless
installation of pen registers127 on telephone lines.

In People v.

Soorleder128

that

the

Colorado

Supreme

Court

noted

state

constitution embodies the identical goal of the fourth amendment,
123. Burrows v. Super. Ct. of San Bernadino Cty., 13 Cal. 3d 238,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170-71, 529 P.2d 590 (1975). Burrows actually
preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller; however, it
has subsequently been reaffirmed several times.
Indeed, the
Burrows rationale has been extended to telephone records and credit
card billings. People v. Mejia, 95 Cal. App. 3d 828, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1979), rejecting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979);
People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738
(1979).
124. 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980). See also Commonwealth v.
DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979) (also rejecting Miller,
applying the Pennsylvania constitution).
125. 612 P.2d at 1120.
126. People v. Mejia, 95 Cal. App. 3d 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1979), rejecting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
127. A pen register is a device that records the outgoing number
dialed, whether the call is answered and the duration of the call.
It is used by police to gather phone numbers of possible associates
of suspected criminals.
128. 666 P.2d 135 (1983).
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to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.

However,

unlike the United States Supreme Court's application of the fourth
amendment,130 the Colorado Supreme Court found a protected privacy
interest in telephone records.
Oregon rounds out the list of western states131 with clauses
textually similar to the fourth amendment, which nonetheless have
been interpreted to offer greater protection against unreasonable
searches.

In State v. Lowrv,

the Oregon Supreme Court held that

small containers seized in a search incident to an arrest may be
secured, but may not be examined without a search warrant.
decision

rests

squarely

in

conflict

with

United

This

States

v.

129. 666 P.2d at 139.
130. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
131. Hawaii, a state to the west, although not often considered a
western state, has also interpreted its search and seizure clause,
again identical to the fourth amendment, as imposing a more
protective standard for searches incident to an arrest. State v.
Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
Washington has also
construed its constitution as more restrictive of police searches.
State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). However,
in an unusual twist, the Washington constitutional drafters
considered a clause textually identical to the fourth amendment and
rejected it in favor of a simple one line statement, much the same
as in the first two Utah constitutions. See State v. Simpson, 95
Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980). Alaska has utilized an
unique sociological argument in determining that its state
constitution should be construed toward broader civil liberties
protections. In Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alaska 1975),
the Alaska Supreme Court based its holding on the frontier heritage
of the state and the traditional notion of wanting to be left alone
to cherish onefs solitude. However, it should be noted that the
Alaska constitution, similar to that of Montana, see supra, note
67, also contains an explicit guarantee of personal privacy. See
also Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979); State v. Glass,
583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
132. 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983).
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Robinson153 and Gustafson v. Florida J34

The Oregon Supreme Court

has consistently exercised its right to decide constitutional
questions under a primacy model ,135 avoiding resort to the federal
constitution whenever possible.136
One should not be left, however, with the impression that the
trend of interpreting state constitutional search and seizure
clauses more broadly than the similar federal counterpart is a
western phenomena. Aside from New York, many of our eastern sister
states have followed the same course.137
courts have often

Notwithstanding, Utah

followed the reasoning of neighbor states'

courts, and have ample guidance in the area of state constitutional
analysis, as applied to search and seizure law.

IV.
Much

of

the

movement

Conclusion
toward

greater

usage

of

state

constitutions has been prompted by judges dissatisfied with the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts1 pronounced retreat from the great

133. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
134. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
135. See supra, note 30.
136. See State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982) (citing
cases)•
137. See, e.g. . Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa.
1983); State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 467 A.2d 571 (1983); State
v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982); People v. Secrest, 413
Mich. 521, 321 N.W.2d 368 (1982); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895
(R.I. 1980); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979);
State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
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civil liberties decisions of the Warren Court.

This has prompted

many conservative critics to cry foul when a state supreme court
begins to take its own state's bill of rights more seriously, for
whatever reason.

This panic and distrust is misplaced.

The very

beauty of the "new federalism" is that decisions are being based
on the documents most amenable to change by the people governed
thereby.

While the United States Supreme Court must necessarily
.

139

pursue a national agenda to some degree,

state courts have been

traditionally,

to

and

remain,

accountable

the

electorate.140

Indeed, when then Chief Justice Burger felt his conservative views
threatened by a state court, he took the unprecedented step of
inviting the state's voters to rebel at the polls,141 a move that
one state court justice termed simply "arrogant."142

The state

138. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—Awav from a
Reactionary Approach. 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1,2 (1981); Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
139. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court
Comment on Federal Issues When Disposing of Cases on State
Constitutional Grounds. 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1027, 1042-45 (1985).
140. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States; The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 535, 549 (1986).
141. In Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983), the Court was forced
to dismiss a petition for certiorari on the basis that the decision
below rested on adequate and independent state grounds, see
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). In his opinion
concurring with the dismissal of certiorari, Chief Justice Burger
reminded the people of Florida that they could cut back
constitutional protections to federal levels by amending their
state constitutions. 462 U.S. at 639.
142. State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983) (Shea,
J., dissenting). See also, Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court
Activism. 63 Tex. L. Rev. 995 (1985).
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court

role

as

"constitutional

laboratories"

envisioned

by

conservative justices may once again be fulfilled.143
Nor must civil libertarians despair.

The United States

Constitution remains the floor of guaranteed liberties.

No state

court can take away what the federal constitution grants.

The

federal courts will continue to "consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardian of [constitutional] rights."144
Judges of Utah's appellate courts have issued the call,
attorneys must now respond.

The Utah State Constitution must be

studied, briefed and argued at every step of litigation, whenever
applicable.

As this article has shown, many factors must be

considered in advancing state constitutional arguments.

Article

1, section 14 is but one example of how our own history and
experiences may guide the courts of this state to sensitive,
sensible decisions premised upon Utah's own constitution.

143. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
144. Statement of James Madison, 1 Annals of Congress 439 (J.
Gales, ed. 1789) quoted in Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights. 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 552 (1986).
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